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Second World War and the subsequent Nuremberg Trial and national prosecutions against those responsible for the horrendous 
crimes left its mark to the history of international law. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention) was adopted not long after the Nuremberg legacy and was applauded with loud cheers of “Never again!”, 
which is still today embedded to Articles of the Genocide Convention. However, recent atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and 
now in Myanmar, have turned the “Never again” into “Yet again?”.  
 
Although the crisis in Myanmar has been a concurrent theme in the UN organs though the years, the crisis is still today unsolved. 
Currently, there are approximately 1,000,000 refugees in neighbouring state Bangladesh, and the Fact-Finding Mission, 
established by the Human Rights Council, estimated in its Report that up to 10,000 deaths have taken place in the violence against 
the Muslim Rohingya. 
 
Rohingya is an ethno-religious term defining Muslim people residing in the borderline area of Arakan or Rakhine State in Western 
Myanmar. The Rohingya have been under persecution several decades. First large-scale campaign against them was launched in 
1978 and it continued when the military junta in Myanmar (then Burma) passed the 1982 Citizenship Law, pursuant to which the 
Rohingya became, de facto, stateless. More recent violence that started in 2017 have led to numerous attacks, where villages 
were destroyed, mass arsons committed, men and boys killed, and woman and girls raped. This has been all conducted by the 
military and security forces of Myanmar. 
 
The Genocide Convention contains an obligation under which the states have an obligation to prevent and punish genocide. Since 
the atrocities of the 1990’s, the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals the ICTY and the ICTR, the establishment of ICC and the 
much-debated judgement of the ICJ relating to the Balkan genocide, the development of international criminal law has accelerated 
from the early days of the Genocide Convention. Different kinds of early warning signs to mass atrocities have been recognized, 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been established, and the paths to judicial tribunals have emerged both for the 
individual liability of the perpetrators and state responsibility. This has not, however, stopped genocide from happening.  
 
A closer look will reveal that no matter from what corner the crime of genocide is examined or viewed, politics are there. The 
governments of states seem to avoid using the term genocide to a certain point, mostly for the fear that it would invoke obligations 
to prevent and protect. Also, the Genocide Convention does not entail any operational dimension as regards to what measures are 
considered preventive. When examining the R2P and its content as regards to more coercive measures, the UN Security Council 
is in charge of authorization of any action. This means that the power is, ultimately, on the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council through their veto rights.  
 
Punishment has a preventive effect, as well, because of its element of deterrence. However, this means that the perpetrators must 
be brought to court effectively. Any non-ratification, or non-party status to the ICC, alongside with reservations made to Article IX of 
the Genocide Convention creates problems with the aspect of punishment.  
 
This Thesis will examine the above-mentioned issues in more detailed way by systemizing the legal framework relating to genocide 
and studying the reasons that affect to the prevention of genocide in a debilitative way. All in all, it is unbearable both for the 
victims and the international community if no action is being made, as it sends the message to the perpetrators that everything is 
allowed. That will lead to the situation, where stopping genocide is impossible. 
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“[I]f we do not record and learn the bitter lessons of the past we are condemned to repeat 
our mistakes.”1 
 
Second World War and the subsequent Nuremberg trial and national prosecutions against 
those responsible for the horrendous crimes left its mark to the history of international law.2 
The concept of genocide, meaning the intentional killing, destruction or extermination of 
groups or members of a group, was first conceived of as a category of crimes against 
humanity. The crime acquired autonomous significance as a specific crime in 1948 when the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide3 was adopted by 
the United Nations’ General Assembly. The Genocide Convention entered into force in 
19514 and was applauded by the international community with loud cheers of “Never 
again!”. The “odious scourge”5 had to be destroyed.   
The Genocide Convention had its 70th birthday in December 2018. Since the Nuremberg 
trial, the international community has adapted slowly but solidly a consensus on the 
legitimacy of the Nuremberg Principles6, the applicability of universal jurisdiction to 
international crimes and the need to punish those who are in breach with their international 
obligations. The phase “Never again!” is still today embedded to the Articles of the Genocide 
Convention. However, the recent atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and in 
Kosovo and Darfur have shocked the conscience of the international community. And now, 
with the crisis of Rohingya, it seems that “Never again!” has become “Yet again?” and very 
little has been done by the UN and its member states in response, although Myanmar has 
been a concurrent theme in the UN organs.7  
Rohingya is an ethno-religious term defining Muslim people residing in the borderline area 
of Arakan or Rakhine State in Western Myanmar (formerly Burma). From the beginning of 
                                                 
1 This was stated by M. Cherif Bassiouni when paraphrasing the philosopher George Santayana in the context 
of describing the international justice system and atrocities taken place in the history. See Bassiouni 1997, p. 
62. 
2 Shany 2009, pp. 16-18.  
3 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide will be hereinafter referred to 
as Genocide Convention. 
4 A/RES/96/1. 
5 Wording of the Genocide Convention, Preamble.  
6 ILC Nuremberg Principles 1950. 
7 The OHCHR keeps a record of the most recent reports concerning the situation in Myanmar. See 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/asiaregion/pages/mmindex.aspx. Last visited: 18 December 2018. 
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August 2017 more than 700,000 out of 1,000,000 Muslim minority Rohingya people from 
Rakhine State of Myanmar have fled their homes to the neighboring country Bangladesh.8 
The number of refugees is still growing, and the international community is facing one of 
the biggest humanitarian crises of all times.  
The conflict in Myanmar is not, however, new. The roots of the conflict escalating today 
date back to 1978 when first large-scale campaign against Rohingya was launched and to 
1982 when the military junta in Myanmar (then Burma) passed the 1982 Citizenship Law 
and the Rohingya lost their citizenship and became stateless considered to be illegal 
immigrants in their own country.9 The Rohingya have been faced with persecution and 
violence ever since, and the situation escalated in 2017 in the aftermath of the attack of 
Rohingya militants against police posts and military base, after which the Buddhist militia 
launched a “clearance operation”. Numerous large-scale attacks on Rohingya villages have 
been made and those attacks have included serious atrocities, including massacres, rape and 
mass arson, by the Myanmar military and security forces.10  
The Human Rights Council established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Myanmar11 by its resolution on 24 March 201712 to examine the infringements of 
fundamentals of international law. After numerous interviews with victims and eyewitnesses 
from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, non-state organizations and former officials 
of Myanmar state institutions, travels to the neighboring countries, visits to the refugee 
camps and several field-missions, the Fact-Finding Mission established that serious human 
rights and humanitarian law violations and abuses had been conducted consistently by the 
Myanmar military. These violations have been committed to with such policies, tactics and 
conduct, which deliberately target civilians, and in the view of the Fact-Finding Mission 
amount to genocide. According to the Report, an estimated 10,000 Rohingya have been 
killed during the violence.13  
                                                 
8 Channel NewsAsia October 2018. 
9 Zarni & Cowley 2014, p. 683. 
10 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, Summary. 
11 The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar shall be hereinafter referred to as the 
“Fact-Finding Mission”. The main findings and recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission are contained 
in UN document A/HRC/39/64. The document A/HRC/39/CRP.2 contains full factual and legal analysis, and 
broader recommendations. 
12 A/HRC/RES/34/22, para. 11. 
13 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, Summary.  
3 
 
Article I of the Genocide Convention states that the contracting parties confirm that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law, 
which they undertake to prevent and to punish. It seems though, as Smith aptly describes, 
that the phrase “Never again!” has more of an ironic echo than that of redemption.14 The 
representative of United Kingdom recently stated to the UN Security Council that the events 
in Myanmar resemble those in Rwanda and Srebrenica some twenty years ago and although 
the genocides there, “to our lasting shame”, could not be prevented then, at least then 
responsible ones were brought in front of the judicial bodies.15  
The Genocide Convention has been criticized of being very weak by being merely an 
invitation to states to prevent and punish genocide but “binding no one to anything”.16 It is 
indeed true, that by the words of the Genocide Convention, the clear bearer of obligation to 
prevent is the territorial state, who, in the most cases, has orchestrated the genocide in the 
first place. To cite Shue, “[w]orse than putting the fox to guard the chicken coop, this is 
putting the fox in charge of apprehending and punishing chicken-killing foxes.”17 
The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was introduced to the world in 2005 with 
the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from atrocities, 
which responsibility is conferred to the international community in case of a failure to act 
upon it. The R2P was designed to stop future Srebrenicas and Rwandas to happen.18 As it 
can be seen, it has not been the case as the Rohingya crisis stays unsolved still today.  
The concrete acts and reactions on the part of the international community preceding the 
report of the Fact-Finding Mission have been avoiding the notion of genocide. Over the 
years, the UN organizations have defined in its documents the Rohingya crisis mainly as 
`human rights violations that may entail categories of crimes against humanity19’ and 
‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’. Word ‘genocide’ was not introduced until the Fact-
Finding Mission’s report was publicized. During the years, the media has, however, been 
louder in its arguments.20  
                                                 
14 Smith 2010, p. 1. 
15 Statement by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom 2018. 
16 Shue 2004, p. 19. 
17 Shue 2004, p. 19.  
18 Stahn 2007, p. 99-100. 
19 A/HRC/13/48, para. 121.   
20 See, for example, The Globe and Mail 2017. 
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All of the above is in the juxtaposition of what is considered to be as aim of the international 
criminal law. An attack against fundamental values, such as peace, security and well-being 
of the world, gives genocide an international element that affects the whole international 
community. Leaning to that, preventing genocide should be a primary focus of the 
international community.21 
The main question of this Thesis is, is stopping genocide a mission impossible? As the 
international community is in the middle of the human rights crisis in Myanmar, the question 
is of great relevancy. How is it possible that the world is facing yet another genocidal crisis? 
To answer to these questions, this Thesis will examine and systematize the legal framework 
relating to genocide and study the reasons that affect to the prevention of genocide in a 
debilitative way. Although the Genocide Convention22 only brings up the prevention and 
punishment of genocide as the obligations of the states, this Thesis is construed into four 
separate issues that have been put in an imaginary time line: naming genocide, prevention 
of genocide, responsibility to protect and punishing of genocide. These are all separate, but 
intertwined, issues that represent also different phases of genocide. The Rohingya case will 
be carried along this Thesis, where relevant.  
Firstly, from the nature of crime it can be concluded that genocide does not happen 
overnight. The root causes for genocide are complex and generated over time, or several 
decades, as in the case of the Rohingya. However, some reasons to the question, why 
genocide does not enjoy the status of “crime of crimes” in reality, can also be found from 
the behavior of the international community. Secondly, it is the obligation of the states to 
prevent genocide, identify the root causes and mitigate them. Thirdly, the R2P, put in the 
imaginary timeline, represents the obligation of the states to protect their population. In this 
Thesis, the R2P is set apart from the obligation to prevent, although they have certain 
similarities. This is to focus more on the possible use of force by the military, when the 
prevention in its conventional form is not possible any more. Fourthly, in order to mirror the 
aftermath of genocide, this Thesis deals with the question of punishment. At this point and 
context, it is acknowledged that the R2P, for example, includes a concept of rebuilding but 
due to the space limits, rebuilding23 is excluded from the scope of this Thesis.  
                                                 
21 Advisory Opinion, Reservations to Genocide Convention (28 May 1951), p. 23. 
22 Genocide Convention, Article I.  
23 As regards to rebuilding, see for example, Evans 2008, pp. 148-174. 
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Chapter 2 of this Thesis functions as a second introduction to the matter, as it goes through 
the Rohingya crisis. The history of the crisis, the political situation of Myanmar, and the 
events in the recent years are summarized, with acknowledgement that the summary may 
not do justice to the quantity and grade of all crimes that the Rohingya have been facing 
through their history. The facts stated in this Thesis are founded on the report of the Fact-
Finding Mission, which contains more detailed description of the events and background of 
the crisis.24 It is also pointed out, in this context, that this Thesis will not aim at considering 
or evidencing if the facts presented by the report of the Fact-Finding Mission amount in 
genocide before the courts. This will be left to the judicial bodies. Rather, this Chapter will 
establish that genocide is indeed a “slow-burning”25 process. Also, Chapter 2 will briefly go 
through the reactions of the international community towards the events in Myanmar. This 
is to establish a view, where the international community stands as regards to the Rohingya 
crisis. 
Before targeting the obligation of prevention of genocide, it is important to understand the 
phenomena genocide behind this need to prevent. Therefore, Chapter 3 of this Thesis will 
view the crime of genocide and its elements, the status of the crime under and outside the 
Genocide Convention and its relationship to ethnic cleansing. Further, it will be examined 
how the states use the word “genocide” and why so strong imperative as prevention of 
genocide remains, for the most part, rhetorical obligation.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the prevention of genocide. This Chapter will examine what are 
the implications of Article I of the Genocide Convention as regards to obligation to prevent. 
Further, it will be studied which parties are obligated to preven and what are the concrete 
acts or steps which the international community have taken or can take towards prevention?  
The R2P doctrine demanded from the individual states, and the international community as 
well, a genuine commitment to employ a range of root-cause of prevention efforts from 
diplomatic means to military intervention that would tackle and halt the atrocities in the 
future. The reasoning for the R2P doctrine was to provide a framework the increasingly 
important element of human security, through protection via different means of intervention. 
Chapter 5 of this Thesis will go through the purpose, legal significance and the relevance of 
                                                 
24 See A/HRC/39/CRP.2. The violations in Myanmar have taken place in various areas, this Thesis will only 
concentrate to those in the Arakan or Rakhine State area.  
25 Zarni & Cowley 2014, p. 1. 
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R2P in relation to preventing genocide. Does the much-valued doctrine bring any relieve to 
the prevention of genocide? 
Then, finally, the questions relating to punishment are being examined in Chapter 6. This 
Chapter aims to answer to the following questions: what kind of role punishment has in the 
prevention of genocide, what are the available paths to punish the perpetrators and what are 
the challenges relating to punishment? On the basis of the previous Chapters, concluding 
remarks will be established in Chapter 7 of this Thesis.  
Main arguments of this Thesis are that although the status of the crime of genocide is well 
established, it still is a politicized term. It should be emphasized more that genocide is a 
crime against the international community, not a domestic problem. Further, taking into 
consideration the nature of the crime, too much has been left to the hands of the territorial 
state. The preventive measures established do not seem to be effective. More weight should 
be given to R2P and the more coercive means therein. In addition, even though we have 
more judicial bodies to bring the perpetrators into justice, the international community 
should aim more for ratifying the statutes of the court, without reservations. As we have a 
dual system for both individual and state responsibility, the international community should 
pursuit the effective use of it. Also, the UN Security Council should act more effectively.  
To conclude this introduction, it is noted, that the issue of preventing genocide is very 
complex due to the nature of the crime. This Thesis is not aiming to be conclusive, it aims 
to raise issues that are most material. It is also acknowledged that this Thesis is repetitive in 






2 THE ROHINGYA CRISIS 
 
“How can it be ethnic cleansing? They are not an ethnic group.”26 
 
2.1 Background to the Rohingya crisis 
 
Even though the crisis concerning Rohingya has been brought to world’s attention more 
widely during the last few years, their history as targeted minority has long roots. To 
understand fully the amount and nature of the persecution that the Rohingya have faced, a 
short overview on the history is in order.  
Myanmar (formerly Burma) is situated in Southeast Asia and shares borders with India and 
Bangladesh in west, Thailand and Laos in east and China in north and northeast. The 
Rohingya population is residing in the borderline area of Arakan or Rakhine State in Western 
Myanmar. The ancestral and cultural roots of the Rohingya lie along the post-colonial 
borders of today’s Myanmar, former British colony until the independence in 1948, and 
Bangladesh (former East Pakistan), which gained independency in 1971.27 
Even the centuries before the British colonial rule, the Rakhine area was full of multi-ethnic 
and multi-faith people. Regardless of the evidence that the Rohingya have populated the 
Rakhine area for ages, majority of the population in Myanmar claims that the Rakhine State 
is a home for the dominant majority group, the Rakhine Buddhists, not Muslim Rohingya. 
The Buddhists have manifested that they have been, and are, in danger both demographically 
and economically because of the Rohingya. The Rohingya have been called as illegal 
immigrants, Bengalis28, who should be expelled from Burma.29 
In the early days of independence of Burma, the Rohingya were recognized as an 
ethnolinguistic group with a right to have a homeland. Since 1962, as the military claimed 
the power in Myanmar, the status of the Rohingya has been erased slowly by the anti-Muslim 
                                                 
26 This was allegedly stated by Mr. Win Myaing, the official spokesperson of the Rakhine State Government 
on 15 May 2013, cited by Reuters, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-
specialreport/special-report-in-myanmar-apartheid-tactics-against-minority-muslims-
idUSBRE94E00020130515.  
27 See Zarni & Cowley 2014, pp. 684-691. 
28 The term ’Bengali’ refers to the immigration of people to the Rakhine area from East Bengal in the British 
colonial era. The Rakhine area borders with the sub-continent of East-Bengal, which later became East Pakistan 
after the partition of India in 1947 and, since 1971, the independent state of Bangladesh. ‘Bengali’ is considered 
to be a racist term implying illegal immigrant status. See also A/HCR/39/CRP.2, para. 460. 
29 A/HRC/39/CRP.2; Zarni & Cowley 2014, p. 685. 
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military-controlled governments. The first large-scale operation, which was the first wave 
of the ethnic cleansing, started in 1978 with the pursuit to separate nationals from non-
nationals pursuant to a military rule. Rohingyas were accused to be illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh and were detained, tortured and violently abused because of that. The Rohingya 
were also forced to hand over their National Registration Cards (NCR) to state actors30. This 
led to a situation where 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. It was the bilateral agreements 
between Bangladesh and Burma, that enabled the Rohingya, however, to repatriate back at 
that time.31 
The repatriation had, however, its consequences. As a counteract, the 1982 Citizenship Act32 
was legislated. The 1982 Citizenship Act was pivotal for the Rohingya as it defined 135 
ethnic groups which were acknowledged in Myanmar. Even though the 1982 Citizenship 
Act as itself did not have any reference to the exclusion of the Rohingya, it was the acts of 
the state that de facto led to that outcome and denial of full citizenship in Myanmar.33 Any 
individual not having the full citizenship were to acquire nationality trough different 
application procedures with high criteria. General Ne Wi also declared that no such 
individual had a right to any position in Myanmar’s governance or armed forces. Further, 
pursuant to the 1982 Citizenship Act, the Rohingya have been under restrictions to travel, 
marry, educate themselves or have healthcare. Although the Rohingya was not the only 
minority excluded from the right to citizenship and access to positions, it quickly became 
the primary victim of discrimination and persecution.34 Still today, the military forces seem 
to claim that Rohingya belong in Bangladesh and therefore, they must accept scrutiny under 
the 1982 Citizenship Act.35 
The wide-scale violations and forced migrations to Bangladesh continued several times in 
the 1990’s, and in 2001 and 2012. Even though the political and economic atmosphere in 
Myanmar changed in 2010 and opened more open freedom to media, it did not change the 
position of the Rohingya. The government of Myanmar increased the military presence in 
                                                 
30 The report of the Fact-Finding Mission establishes that NCR’s were confiscated or teared. See 
A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 100.   
31 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, par. 475. 
32 1982 Citizenship Act. 
33 According to Constitution of Myanmar, every citizen shall enjoy the rights to equality, liberty and justice 
and shall not be discriminated based on, inter alia, race, birth, religion and culture. Therefore, Rohingya, being 
stateless, are excluded from basic human rights protection. See A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 66-68 and paras. 477-
479; 2008 Constitution, Sections 21 and 348.  
34 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para 477. 
35 According to Channel NewsAsia, this was stated by Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing in September 
2018. See Channel NewsAsia October 2018.  
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the borders of Rakhine State to minimize the external support to the Rohingya. The 
government of Myanmar, international community and even some of the UN agencies, 
continued to describe the violence as communal and sectarian.36 Ever since, the Rohingya 
people have been under state-level plans, which aim to suppress and destroy the population. 
In 2013 the UN described the Rohingya as one of the most persecuted minorities in the 
world.37  
 
2.2 Political status of Myanmar 
 
When examining the situation in Myanmar, strong military domination in the politics of the 
state stands out. An all-powerful military ‘Tatmadaw’ has ruled the country for most of its 
existence. Myanmar (then Burma) was a parliamentary democracy until the military 
takeover by General Ne Win in 1962, but even before that, the military had its influence on 
the government. Under the lead of Ne Win, the military used its control over the country 
claiming that it was necessary for the territorial integrity of the country against, inter alia, 
ethnic armed organizations38. Following the takeover by Ne Win, a regime with restrictions 
on political activities, suppression of ethnic rebellions and arrests of political opponents was 
established. Even today, the military uses national sovereignty and territorial integrity as an 
excuse for its actions to suppress ethnic minorities39.  
Aung San Suu Kyi has long appeared as a voice of hope and democracy for Myanmar as a 
head of political party of National League for Democracy (NLD). Her prominence built up 
during the general strikes, which ultimately led to the resignation of the General Ne Win and 
replacement of the old military regime. However, she was placed under house arrest in 1989. 
This did not, however, prevent the NLD from gaining 60 per cent of the popular vote in the 
general election of 1990, the military junta with tight control held up. Those NLD 
representatives who had been elected to the parliament were either arrested or fled40. That is 
                                                 
36 See Zarni & Cowley 2014. 
37See, for example,  
 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22491&LangID=E.  
Last visited: 18 December 2018. 
38 ’Ethnic armed organizations’ is a term referring to non-state armed groups operating in northern and 
eastern part of Myanmar for maintaining political opposition to the State. 
39 See Zarni & Cowley 2014. 
40 For more detailed description, see, for example, A/53/364, para. 16 et seq. 
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the reason why, throughout the 1990s, Western world imposed strong sanctions against 
Myanmar, which led to the notable rise of cost of basic commodities. 
In 2010, when the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 
General Thein Sein, the leader of the USDP, became President. His government started to 
implement number of reforms, including freeing most political prisoners and reducing 
censorships a restriction on the media. After liberalization, also Aung San Suu Kyi was 
released from the house arrest and the Western world gave up the sanctions and increased 
foreign investments.41 Alongside economical wealth, this generated international goodwill 
to Myanmar in its steps towards democratization. 
Democratization and respect of human rights has been long due for Myanmar and it has been 
a country of concern of the UN since the protests in 1988 and general elections in 1990. The 
General Assembly of the UN adopted its first resolution on the situation in Myanmar in 1991 
and that substantive available information indicated grave breaches of human rights.42 After 
that, similar resolutions have been adopted through the years. The Commission of Human 
Rights has stated that there had not been any apparent progress in giving effect to the political 
will of the people of Myanmar and created a mandate of Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights situation in 199243. All three following Special Rapporteurs up today have repeated 
the concern. Current Special Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana pointed out in 2010 that gross 
and systemic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar have taken place for many years 
and that the lack of accountability of Myanmar is an indicator that these violations are a 
result of state policy, which involves authorities at all military and judicial levels.44  
 
2.3 Years 2017-2018 
 
In late 2015, an ethnic Rakhine armed group called ARSA, started to operate in the Rakhine 
State. The aim of the ARSA was to gain self-determination for ethnic Rakhine people and 
safekeep their cultural heritage and national dignity. In the years that followed, the ARSA 
had encounters with the Tatmadaw forces, and they became gradually deadlier. However, 
                                                 
41 According to World Bank sources of the report of the Mission, foreign investments more than tripled from 
USD 901 million in 2010 to USD 3,2 billion in 2016. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 77-79. 
42 A/RES/46/132. 
43 E/CN.4/RES/1992/58. The Commission of Human Rights expressly cited the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.” 
44 A/HRC/13/48, para. 121. 
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according the report of the Fact-finding Mission, the acts of the military forces always 
exceeded those of the ARSA.45 
25 August 2017 and the following days mark the starting point of the events that escalated 
in to the situation what we know today. On 25 August, the ARSA launched coordinated 
attacks on the military base and outposts of security force across the northern Rakhine State 
as to response to the increased pressure on the Rohingya population and with a goal to gain 
international attention. According to the report to the Fact-finding Mission, the ARSA had 
small number of arms, untrained villagers fought with sticks and knives and some had 
improvised explosive devices. Twelve security personnel were killed by the attacks.46 
The response of the security and military forces of Myanmar was operated within hours 
against the Rohingya, with brutal and clearly disproportionate means. By 5 September 2017, 
40 per cent of the villages in Northern Rakhine State were partially or destroyed, and the 
attacks resulted in escapes of 725,000 Rohingya people to Bangladesh.47 This number is 
growing still today. 
 
2.4 Reactions of the international community to the Rohingya crisis 
 
 Myanmar  
 
Myanmar is party to a multiple international treaties and conventions, in relation which it is 
in breach. First, Myanmar is bound by the UN Charter and is therefore committed to act for 
the achievement of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.48 Alongside the 
Genocide Convention, Myanmar is also a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, which Article 3 includes protection of civilians and other persons not being directly a 
part of the hostilities, and other international treaties under which it has obligations towards 
                                                 
45 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 408.  
46 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 750. 
47 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 751. The report of the Fact-finding Mission refers to a Facebook post of 
Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, who had stated in the heat of the clearance operation 
that “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of 
the previous governments to solve it. This government is taking great care in solving the problem.” The link to 
said Facebook post has been later defuncted.  
48 UN Charter, Art. 55(c) and Art. 56. 
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its citizens and international community.49 In the national level, the Constitution of Myanmar 
provides guarantees for human rights, such as right to equality and non-discrimination, the 
right to life and right to freedom, which means that citizens of Myanmar shall not be 
discriminated on the basis of race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and 
wealth.50  
However, as the Rohingya are de facto stateless, the 1982 Citizenship Act has acted as a 
legal base for all the discrimination and the Constitution does not secure their rights. The 
international community has numerous times expressed its view that the 1982 Citizenship 
Act should be reviewed and reformed so that the gaining of nationality would be non-
discriminatory and not of racial issue. The response of Myanmar has been uncompromising, 
as the government believes the 1982 Citizenship Act is highly supported by the public 
opinion.51 All violence that has happened in Myanmar, has been executed with impunity on 
the side of the government.52 
In 2016, Myanmar responded to the concerns of the international community by forming an 
Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State. The Advisory Commission was composed of 
six national and three international members and chaired by the former UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan. The mandate of the Advisory Commission was to find lasting solutions 
to the complex and delicate issues of the Rakhine State, in accordance with the international 
standards. The Myanmar government also formed a Central Committee for the 
Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State, with the State Counsellor Aung 
San Suu Kyi as chairperson.53 
The Advisory Commission handed over its final report in August 2017 with its 
recommendations to the Myanmar government. The State Counsellor welcomed 
“meaningful and long-term solutions” but emphasized that the concerns of the international 
community show “troubling signs of external interference aimed at aggravating an already 
difficult situation”.54  
                                                 
49 For example, Myanmar is a party to Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See 
A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 33 et seq. 
50 Constitution of Myanmar, Chapter VIII (Citizen, Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens). 
51 Zarni & Cowley 2014, p. 703.  
52 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 103. 
53 Advisory Commission Final Report 2017. 
54 Statement by the Office of the State Counsellor on the Advisory Commission Report, paras. 2-3.  
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A lot of the attention of the world has been directed to the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu 
Kyi. Her office has repeatedly either dismissed or underrated the allegations relating to the 
Rohingya crisis and put them into the categories of “fake rape”, “fake news” and “huge 
iceberg of misinformation”.55 The former Nobel Peace Winner has since been called as 
democracy icon that has fell from grace.56 Aung San Suu Kyi has commented that there are 
difficulties in Myanmar, but people should rather recognize and solve them than exaggerate 
them seem worse. She later stated that ethnic cleansing is a too strong term to use and used 
the term hostility between the parties.57 The Fact-finding Mission concluded in the report 
that Aung San Suu Kyi had failed to use her position as a head of government, or her moral 
authority, to stem or prevent the Rohingya crisis.58 What once were a beacon for universal 
human rights, is now considered to be something else. 
The lack of cooperation from the side of the Myanmar government is a theme that recurs in 
the UN resolutions, OCHCR reports and in the report of the Fact-Finding Mission.59 
Myanmar has rejected all the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission. The UN Ambassador of 
Myanmar stated to the Security Council that they are willing and able to take on the 
accountability issues for any alleged human rights violations when there is sufficient 
evidence.60 This means that the whole Report of the Fact-Finding Mission has been 




All the four Special Rapporteurs of the OCHCR have since 1992 concluded that the human 
rights violations in Myanmar have been widespread and systematic, followed a pattern and 
linked to state and its military policy.61 In 1998, the Special Rapporteur Rajsmoor Lallah 
gave an alarming description on the situation: “[t]he Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned 
about the serious human rights violations that continue to be committed by the armed forces 
in the ethnic minority areas. The violations include extrajudicial and arbitrary executions 
(not sparing women and children), rape, torture, inhuman treatment, forced labour and 
                                                 
55 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1339-1340. See also BBC (January 2018).  
56 BBC (September 2018). 
57 BBC (January 2018).  
58 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1548. 
59 A/53/364, para. 55; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, Summary, para. 3; E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 10. 
60 See, for example, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13552.doc.htm. Last visited: 18 December 2018. 
61 A/53/364, para. 55; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, Summary, para. 3; E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 10. 
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denial of freedom of movement. These violations have been so numerous and consistent over 
the past years as to suggest that they are not simply isolated or the acts of individual 
misbehavior by middle- and lower-rank officers but are rather the result of policy at the 
highest level, entailing political and legal responsibility.62” Further, all the Special 
Rapporteurs have pointed out that in addition to these systematic violations, there is also a 





The international community recognizes the Rohingya as an ethnic group. But for some 
parts, the Rohingya crisis has been labelled as communal violence.64 This view is 
problematic, since if the crisis at hand is described as domestic, the international attention to 
it is of minor importance despite of how brutal the conflict may be. The imperative of crisis 
situations is the world’s major powers’ political will to act. It is unfortunate for the victims 
how politicians often allow intentionally time to pass so that the public interest and pressure 
is faded, and they are no longer obliged to act or ensure the success of, for example, 
investigative bodies.65 
For example, in the case of Yugoslavia, the political climate and nature of the crisis was in 
juxtaposition at first. However, the pursuit of justice woke up later as a response to 
international concerns and to brutal atrocities that the media brought up. In the case of the 
Rohingya, because the major powers have not wanted to have any intervention, so far neither 
the UN or EU had interest to actuate any mission to end the hostilities.66 
The Rohingya crisis has received large amount of visibility during recent years. The 
challenge is, like with any other crisis, to make sure that the issue is not forgotten. It requires 
ongoing attention from the media, ongoing research from organizations and ongoing 
monitoring form the UN agencies. The media attention can be, however, problematic in 
some cases. Schabas uses the definition “the genocide mystique” to describe a situation when 
states invoke genocide just to get attention, stir debate and excite the media. Perhaps, due to 
                                                 
62 A/53/364, para. 90. 
63 A/53/364, para. 51; E/CN.4/1995/35; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para 1620. 
64 Zarni & Cowley 2014, pp. 688 et seq. 
65 Bassiouni 1997, pp. 11-12. 
66 Bassiouni 1997, pp. 40.  
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the situations where term genocide has been misused for demagogical purposes describing 
situations that have not been genocidal, the international community has since carefully 
placed its words and avoids using the term.67 
The Rohingya crisis indeed shows that violence that took place in 2017 is just a tip of an 
iceberg. There have been many opportunities for the international community to act but so 
far it has settled for solving the problem through UN diplomacy. It should be noted that 
however domestic or internal the conflict is (or is claimed to be), it is the scale and the nature 
of the crime of genocide that makes it very much an issue of international one. Foreign states 
are forced to have a role either by providing refuge, prosecuting them before their own 
jurisdiction or in facilitating the extradition of the accused.68 
 
3 NAMING GENOCIDE 
 
“That day felt like the last day of this world, as if the whole world was collapsing. I thought 
judgment day had arrived.69” 
 
3.1 The Nuremberg legacy and the Genocide Convention 
 
As can be concluded from the above citation, there is a true ring to it that genocide shocks 
the conscience of the mankind.70  The victims have lost they human dignity and become prey 
to the perpetrators.71 Therefore, it is no wonder that genocide is often described as a crime 
of crimes and placed among the most heinous mass atrocities. The legacy of such status is 
very much rooted to the Nuremberg legacy as described next.  
Still today, we remember the horrendous events of the Holocaust, where over 6,000,000 
Jewish people were systematically attacked and killed. The spirit of “Never again” affected 
                                                 
67 Schabas 2012, pp. 101-103.  
68 Reydams 1996, p. 20. 
69 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, p. 179. The Report cites a victim heard while gathering evidence. 
70 Rome Statute, Preamble. 
71 May cites one of the officials in the Rwandan gacaca court session that stated: “Celui qui tuait ne voyait pas 
qu’il touait un homme, il croyait tuer un animal suite aux lecons données par les autotorités d’alors.” To 
translate freely: “The one who kills, does not see a human, he kills an animal by the orders of the authorities”. 
See May 2010.   
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to the birth of the UN and to the Genocide Convention and even the international criminal 
tribunals of today have certain features of the International Military Tribunal.72 
The International Military Tribunal, or the Nuremberg Tribunal, was established in 1945 
after the World War II. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal entailed 
three categories of crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.73 
What makes the Nuremberg Tribunal special and relevant even today, is that it held for the 
first time in the history the senior state officials who had committed crimes acting on behalf 
of or with the protection of their personally accountable. This showed an influential example, 
pursuant to which the crimes were not committed not just against the victims of the 
Holocaust but against the international community as a whole.74 Understandably, after the 
Nuremberg trials, the atmosphere strongly pressured the efforts to further develop and refine 
international criminal law to ensure the criminal accountability of persons committing 
genocide. This marks the starting point for the birth of the Genocide Convention.75.  
As can be seen from the abovementioned subject-matter jurisdiction of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, it did not include genocide as a term. The term 76 was invented by a Polish lawyer, 
Raphael Lemkin, to describe the crimes committed by the Nazis. It meant the intentional 
killing, destruction or extermination of groups or members of a group, definition of which 
can be found also from the Genocide Convention, albeit in a longer form.77  
The crime of genocide was first defined and determined as crime under international law by 
UN General Assembly in 1946. The UN General Assembly authorized the UN Economic 
and Social Council to draft a proposal for the wording of the Genocide Convention with a 
group of experts, such as Lemkin.78 The international community was ready to commit to 
the Articles as after few years of drafting and modification, so the draft of Genocide 
Convention was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 9 December 194879 and 
                                                 
72 Calvo-Goller 2006, pp. 9-10.  
73 Schabas 2009, p. 43. 
74 Drumbl 2007, p. 3.  
75 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide will be referred hereinafter to 
as the “Genocide Convention” or the “Convention”. 
76 The word ’genocide’ is formed from two foreign words; the Greek ‘genos’, for race, and Latin ‘caedere’, 
for killing. See for the background of the definition Smith 2010, pp. 21-22. 
77 Art. I of the Genocide Convention. 
78 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en. Last 
visited: 18 December 2018. 
79 A/RES/96(1); Werle & Jessberger 2014, p. 291-292.  
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it came into effect in 1951. Up to date, almost 150 states, including Myanmar, have ratified 
the Genocide Convention.80 
However, the purpose of the Genocide Convention, liberation of mankind from an “odious 
scourge”81, has not been fulfilled to its most. As we have witnessed, for example, by the 
Balkan and Rwandan genocide, the spirit of “Never again” has not held its place in terms of 
stopping genocide from taking place. This has not however changed the normative situation 
as regards to the Genocide Convention. It is still the only normative framework for genocide 
in its original form of 1948.  
The world has changed a lot since World War II, and thus it is not a surprise that over the 
years, the content and formulation of the Genocide Convention has encountered a lot of 
criticism for its inadequacy. 82 However, even though the Genocide Convention has stayed 
the same, the case law of the international tribunals has had a significant part on developing 
and specifying the content of the Genocide Convention. It was the judges of the ICTR that 
were the first ones to interpret and apply the legal definition of genocide in practice.83 And 
subsequently, the ICTY and the ICJ have in turn contributed to the matter in their judgements 
concerning the Balkan genocide. It can be therefore concluded that some normative and 
institutive gaps of the Genocide Convention have therefore been fulfilled. 
On the date of this Thesis, the Genocide Convention has reached its 67th birthday since 
entering into force. Even though the Convention is several decades old, the declaration in its 
preamble text is very much of today -  genocide is inflicting great losses on humanity and 
the international community should act in cooperation in combating the crime.84  
 
 
                                                 
80 See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
Last visited: 18 December 2018. 
81 Genocide Convention, Preamble. 
82 A lot of the criticism towards the Genocide Convention is related to the notion of protected groups and the 
exclusion of political ones. According to Schabas the four protected groups were drafted in the Genocide 
Convention because they represented best the groups that were targeted in the Holocaust. Schabas also raises 
the limited range of punishable acts of the Genocide Convention. See Schabas 2012, pp. 110-114. It has also 
been criticized that the Genocide Convention does not entail the issues relating to the state responsibility. See, 
for example, Shany 2007, p. 4.  
83 Statute of the ICTR. The ICTR’s jurisdiction covered the violations committed between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994.  
84 Genocide Convention, Preamble; Shany 2007, p. 11. Shany describes that the call for the cooperation of the 




3.2 The legal concept of genocide 
  
 Definition of genocide 
 
The definition of genocide is included to Article II of the Genocide Convention, which 
provides that: 
“[i]n the present Convention genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group:  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group:  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”85  
 
Therefore, three considerations are required, when invoking genocide: whether the attacked 
group falls in the above-mentioned criteria of protected group, whether any acts described 
in Article II have been committed and whether the acts have been committed with special, 
genocidal intent.  
At the first glance, the definition of genocide seems quite straightforward. Moreover so, as 
the list of genocidal acts enumerated therein is exhaustive. Other acts, no matter that they 
would be committed with intent to destroy a protected group, are not genocide. However, a 
closer examination will unveil that the definition bears some ambiguities and vagueness. As 
regards to the acts enumerated in Article II, such as killing and causing serious bodily or 
mental harm, the ICJ has considered that they cannot be interpreted isolated from the context 
of the purpose of the Genocide Convention – the prevention and punishment of genocide.86 
In addition to that, the ICJ has further interpreted, among other things, the following parts 
of Article: what is the meaning and scope of “destruction” of a group, what does destruction 
                                                 
85 Genocide Convention, Article II. 
86 Genocide case (Judgement, 3 February 2015), para. 149. 
19 
 
of a group “in part” means, and what can be considered as evidence constituting special 
intent?87 These are all fundamental questions and issues to which the Genocide Convention 
does not provide answers, but they are in the essence of determining whether or genocide 
has happened.  
Concluding the existence of genocide by legal terms is not thus as easy as it may seem. One 
of the features, that makes genocide special compared to other mass atrocities, is the 
genocidal intent. Convictions for genocide can be entered only where the special intent has 
been unequivocally established.88  
 
 The specific intent to destroy 
 
Specific intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group is the feature of 
genocide that distinguishes it from other mass atrocities and gives the crime its special 
character.89 Therefore, the evidentiary considerations are the in the essence of defining the 
intent. However, the Rules of Evidence90 of the international tribunals serve little detailed 
norms on the assessment of the evidence. As it has been established in the preceding 
paragraphs, the definition of genocide has been clarified by the international tribunals and 
the content of special intent is no exception. Therefore, a closer look to the case law is in 
order. The question is, how to prove that a perpetrator acted with the required specific intent? 
Whether committing genocide requires always a genocidal policy has been a much-debated 
issue. There are views against and for it, and then there is also the view that holds that for 
some acts enumerated in Article II of the Genocide Convention systematic or widespread 
practice or plan is required and for some it is not.91 Cassese argues that first two genocidal 
acts enumerated in Article II, killing members of the group and causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to the members of the group , do not require a genocidal policy, although they 
                                                 
87 Genocide case (Judgement, 3 February 2015), paras. 133-148. Jessberger has examined the acts enumerated 
in Article II of the Genocide and how the elements therein have been interpreted by the international tribunals. 
See Jessberger 2007, pp. 96-103. 
88 Prosecutor v. Krstic (19 April 2004), para. 134. 
89 Milanović 2006, p. 558. 
90 The ICC, the ICTY and the ICTR all have their own specific Rules of Procedure and Evidence by which 
they are bound.  
91 See for example, Milanović 2006, p. 566 et seq. 
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are of then tolerated, approved or condoned by governments. The last three genocidal acts, 
however, require collective action.92  
In any case, evidencing the genocidal intent requires proof of framework, policy or plan 
within the accused has functioned. In the cases of international tribunals, claims against 
accused persons have always failed when the court has not been able to link the acts 
committed to a genocidal intent.93 Acceptance or dismissal of certain evidence and/or 
distinctions in weighing the value of the evidence have therefore a direct effect on finding a 
perpetrator accountable. In addition, despite of a positive ruling, the reasonings for 
evidentiary statements may often be further examined in the appeals chambers of the 
tribunals. For example, in the case of Zigiranyirazo, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR 
convicted the defendant to 20 years of imprisonment for genocide, but he was later acquitted 
by the Appeals Chamber after having noticed errors in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of 
evidence.94 
Behrens describes well the problem of evidencing specific intent. He states that the need for 
conclusive analysis of the evidentiary situation is particularly strong in cases where 
subjective perception lies at the heart of the matter. Nonetheless, the objective view has its 
own difficulties too. The eyewitnesses may be unreliable and documentary evidence may 
have room for interpretation. Without any statement by the victims, the courts are unable to 
assess the thought process of the perpetrator. However, sometimes even the eyewitnesses 
may not be enough to establish the specific intent.95 
A material situation arises if the court must decide if genocide has been committed, as was 
in the case in the Genocide Case.96 When comparing the evidence of the acts enumerated in 
Article II of the Genocide Convention, the actus reus to mens rea, the special intent of the 
perpetrator, the actus reus is more easily proved. Simply put, causing serious bodily or 
mental harm or killing members of the group are more visible to the eye. The special intent 
to destroy, on the other hand, is not.97  
                                                 
92 Cassese 2007, p. 129-135.  
93 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (14 December 1999), para. 97; Werle & Jessberger 2014; p. 321. 
94 Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo (16 November 2009), para. 73. 
95 Behrens 2011, p. 663.  
96 Genocide Case (Judgement 26 February 2007), para. 1. 
97 Behrens 2011, p. 663. 
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For example, in the Genocide Case, the ICJ had the task of evaluating if genocide had taken 
place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The court ruled, after following the ICTY’s qualification98 as 
regards to defining the protected group, that acts committed at Srebrenica would fall within 
Article II of the Genocide Convention and that there was a specific intent to destroy in part 
of the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such.99 The genocide was, 
however limited just for the mass killings at Srebrenica, as the court could not establish the 
special intent for the other atrocities committed.100 Also there the ICJ followed the ICTY, 
which was having similar problems to establish genocide beyond all reasonable doubt.101 
The court was given a second chance to review the issue in 2015, but it reiterated the 
judgement of 2007.102 
The elements of genocide require that genocide is not just about the acts committed, it is the 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part the targeted group. However, as 
the ICJ concluded, it is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because of the 
membership, but something more is required – intent to destroy should be significant enough 
to have an impact on the group as a whole.103 This means, in the case of the Rohingya, that 
people were not being killed because they were Rohingya Muslims but because of the intent 
to destroy the Rohingya Muslims group as such. 
The standard of proof what is required for proving genocide varies between the ICJ and other 
international tribunals. The Rules of the Court, as adopted by the ICJ, state that the method 
of handling evidence shall be settled by the court after assessing the view of the parties.104 
Depending on the case and its nature, the ICJ therefore reserves the right to adopt standards 
of proof that may vary. However, the ICJ has set up the standard of proof quite high. In the 
Genocide case the court stated that to prove genocide “a high level of certainty appropriate 
to the seriousness of the allegation” is needed.105 The international tribunals, the ICTY, the 
                                                 
98 Prosecutor v. Krstic (2 August 2001), para.560; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (19 April 2004), para. 22.  
99 Genocide case (Judgement of 26 February 2007), paras. 296-297. The ICJ stated that it had no reasons to 
disagree with ICTY’s Trial Chamber’s and Appeals Chamber’s findings.  
100 Genocide case (Judgement of 26 February 2007), para. 370. 
101 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (14 December 1999), paras. 106, 108. 
102 Genocide case (Judgement of 3 February 2015), paras. 295, 360, 394 and 440.  
103 Genocide case (Judgement of 26 February 2007), paras. 187, 198. 
104 Rules of the Court 1978, Article 58.  
105 Genocide case (Judgement of 26 February 2007), para. 210.  
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ICTR and the ICC, have set the standard of proof to the level of “beyond reasonable doubt”, 
which is derived from the presumption of innocence.106 
To help the task of determination of genocide, the ICTR developed a method of deducing 
the specific intent from certain indicators. In the Akayesu case following indicators were 
introduced, among others:  
(i) general range of criminal acts systematically targeting the same group committed 
by the perpetrator;  
(ii)  the scale and general nature of the acts committed in a region or country; and 
(iii) systematical and deliberate targeting of victims because of their membership to 
a group while excluding others.107 
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, the court referred to the Akayesu case and further 
elaborated the indicators to include, for example:  
(iv) physical targeting of the group or their property108;  
(v) use of derogatory language towards the targeted group; and 
(vi) methodical way of planning, systematic manner of killing and number of 
victims.109  
The court also brought up the fact that the killings did not only target men, but also pregnant 
women, elderly and children was an indicator of the destruction of a group.110 The court 
however noted that the contextual indicators used to determine special intent should be, 
however, counterbalanced with the actual conduct and acts of the perpetrator.111 Therefore, 
the acts of genocide should correspond the special intent.  
                                                 
106 Rome Statute, Article 66; ICTY RPE, Rule 87 (A) and ICTR RPE, Rule 87 (A). Article 66 of the Rome 
Statute declares that everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court, it is the task of 
the Prosecutor to prove guilt and in order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 87 (A) of the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE, respectively, states that 
a finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt.  
107 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu (2 September 1998), para. 523. 
108 Also the ICTY has stated that attacks on cultural or religious property or symbols can be related to the 
determination of specific intent. See Prosecutor v. Kristic (2 August 2001), para. 595. It should be noted that 
the crime of genocide has had less prominent place in the ICTY Statute compared to the ICTR Statute. 
According to van den Herik, this may be a result from labelling the events in the Balkan, excluding Srebrenica, 
as ethnic cleansing. See van den Herik 2007, pp. 79-80.  
109 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (21 May 1999), para. 93. 
110 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu (2 September 1998), para 532. The ICTR stated therein that “[M]en and women, 
old and young, were killed without mercy. Children were massacred before their parents’ eyes, women raped 
in front of their families. No Tutsi was spared, neither the weak nor the pregnant.” 
111 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (7 June 2001), para. 63. 
23 
 
When comparing the list of indicators above with the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission, 
a lot of resemblance can be found. The Report establishes that there been, among others, 
systematic criminal attacks against the Rohingya as a group, destruction of their properties 
and hate speech.112 Therefore, it can be concluded from the above that the fact-finding 
missions bear an important role by laying down the facts and evidence to the acknowledge 
of the international community. In that sense, it is easy to second Bassiouni’s view that the 
task of such missions is utmost important: while cries for accountability for “ethnic 
cleansing” or “mass rapes” by the media or reports can be overlooked or ignored, the large-
scale and detailed evidence gathered by the fact-finding missions cannot.113  
Evidence-wise, the fact-finding missions shall follow the practices established for 
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions, as outlined in the 2015 OHCHR 
publication.114 From that publication it can be concluded that the evidence for proving 
special intent by the fact-finding mission is lower than that required in the criminal 
proceedings. The standard of proof will be met, when a sufficient and reliable body of 
primary information, being consistent with other information provided, would allow an 
ordinarily prudent person to reasonably conclude that a case, incident or pattern of conduct 
had occurred.115 When making factual determinations about the destruction of the Rohingya, 
the Fact-Finding Mission has therefore employed the standard of reasonable grounds in 
accordance with the above-mentioned guidance and practices.  
Although the level of proof is lower for the Fact-Finding Mission, the task at the operational 
level is difficult. Potential witnesses are afraid to speak their experiences even confidentially. 
According to the Report, even the aid workers, diplomats, journalists were in some cases 
unwilling to share their information to the Fact-Finding Mission. This was because of the 
risk that it might hinder their future access to Myanmar and they might face reprisal 
measures. Therefore, one of the utmost specific attention of the Mission is to protect the 
victims and the witnesses.116  
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114 Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions – Guidance and Practice 2015.  
115 To learn more about the methods of meeting the standard of proof and the notion of first and second-hand 
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3.3 The status of “crime of crimes” 
 
A lot of the special condemnation of genocide derives from the history behind the 
international criminalization of the crime. Therefore, genocide has been in many cases put 
in a pedestal, to the top of the pyramid of crimes, as being the most heinous international 
crime. Among others, genocide has been described as “crime of crimes”117, “epitome of 
evil”118, “extreme of evil” 119 and “the ultimate human rights problem”120. International co-
operation is required “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.121” There 
seems to be, however, differencing views also.  
In the case of Darfur, there has been critique relating to the public interest being focused too 
much on whether or not there existed a genocidal policy in the Sudanese Government.122 
Also, some have contested that there should not be ranking between the most serious crimes, 
as elements of such crimes may overlap and be closely related.123 For example, when 
comparing genocide and crimes against humanity, it can be concluded that whereas Article 
II of the Genocide Convention protects the four groups, national, ethnical, racial and 
religious, crimes against humanity have a broader scope concerning the civilian population. 
Further, whereas genocide is concerned with physical destruction or extermination of the 
protected groups, crimes against humanity entail, in accordance with Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute, attacks against fundamental rights of various forms. Even though the repercussions 
and effects of the both may overlap, genocide is not considered to be a special form of crimes 
against humanity. Therefore, a separate conviction for both is needed in order to punish the 
wrongfulness of the acts in their entirety and to the fullest extent.124  
The protected values that are so fundamental give the crime of genocide its status. Although 
the ICTR Appeals Chamber stated in Kayishema and Ruzindana that there is no hierarchy 
of crimes under the ICTR Statute and that all crimes therein are serious violations of 
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international humanitarian law125, there is however something special about the crime of 
genocide. For example, in the Kristic case, the judges have noted that the characteristics of 
genocide breaching the protection of right to life of human groups makes the crime 
exceptionally grave and distinguishes it from other crimes. The tribunal used persecution, 
prohibited under the crimes against humanity, as an example. There the perpetrator chooses 
his victims because they are members of certain specific community, he does not necessarily 
aim at destroying such community as such.126  
 
3.4 Status of the crime of genocide outside the Genocide Convention 
 
As it has been established above, the Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide 
and contains the aim for preventing and punishing the crime. However, genocide has 
significant status outside the Genocide Convention as well, as it is part of customary 
international law127 and has a status of ius cogens.128  
The origins of the Genocide Convention show that the will of the UN General Assembly was 
to punish genocide as a crime under the international law. The UN General Assembly 
described genocide as a denial of existence of entire human groups, which is contrary not 
only moral law but also the spirit and aims of the UN.129 As a consequence of that, the 
principles contained in the Genocide Convention are binding on states, even without any 
conventional obligation, as the prohibition of genocide is vested in the principles of civilized 
nations. Further, the cooperation of states in preventing and punishing genocide has an 
universal scope.130 This status has also been endorsed by the international tribunals.131 
In relation to genocide, after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the major substantive 
provisions of the Genocide Convention have gradually evolved into being customary 
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international law. The peremptory norm of genocide, Article II of the Genocide Convention, 
has been included in the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and most recently, in the statute of the 
ICC.132 According to the scholars, this reflects the states’ reactions to the crime of genocide 
and how it is collectively seen as something the world needs to eradicate from the globe.133  
The common understanding is that ius cogens norms should be respected and because of 
that, states cannot take any actions which are against such norms.134 However, when dealing 
with ius cogens norms, also their enforcement should be considered. While ius cogens norms 
contain the idea of hierarchy of norms and international public order, the obligations erga 
omnes deal with the enforcement of ius cogens norms. When a breach of ius cogens takes 
place, it is thus a legal interest of any member of international community to protect and take 
steps to enforce these norms, even if it is not directly affected.  
The relationship between ius cogens and erga omnes is also recognized in the case law of 
the international tribunals. In the Kupreskic case, the ICTY held that peremptory norms of 
international humanitarian law (including prohibition of genocide) are norms of ius cogens 
which give arise to obligations erga omnes.135 The concept of erga omnes appeared also in 
the Barcelona Traction Case, where the ICJ stated that obligations towards international 
community as a whole do exist and all states have a legal interest in protecting them because 
of their importance.136 Further, the ICJ stated in its decision of 1996 that rights and 
obligations of the Genocide Convention are erga omnes. Obligation to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Genocide Convention.137 
The concept of ius cogens is therefore two-folded: on one hand, the status imposes 
obligations erga omnes138 upon states, and on the other hand, it gives rights to the states to 
proceed against perpetrators of such ius cogens crimes.139 This seems to be in line with the 
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UN General Assembly’s view when it stated that preventing and punishing genocide has an 
universal scope.  
Considering the legal definition of genocide, the features that make it the crime of crimes, 
added with its status as peremptory norm, it seems that in the there is a gap between the legal 
framework and the (legal) reality. Since adopting the Genocide Convention, there has been 
a good number of genocide cases, which have in many parts left the perpetrators unpunished. 
Even the common sense says that a breach of treaty obligation, let alone a breach of ius 
cogens norm, should strongly imply accountability and condemnation of the crime. As 
Bassiouni further states, bridge between legal framework and reality can be built by 
international pronouncements and scholarly writings in some part, but the threshold question 
remains the same: how we can ensure that norm, whether deriving from convention or ius 
cogens, is effectively enforceable under international criminal law and creates responsibility 
in case of breach thereof.140  
 
3.5 Concept of genocide in discourse 
 
 The legal and social norm 
 
Even though genocide is one of the most heinous abuses of human rights, the reactions of 
European governments in the post-Cold War era have not matched the severity of the crime. 
European governments rarely have agreed on calling a situation genocide and their 
contribution on preventing genocide has often been limited to serving humanitarian aid to 
victims and supporting prosecution in the international criminal tribunals. Given the nature 
of the crime of genocide and the importance of the protection of human rights, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the states would have a unanimous view how they should respond 
to a genocide being committed in another country, and that the response would be forceful 
and assertive. However, as Smith concludes, more coercive measures such as sanctions and 
military interventions have usually been considered as unnecessary or irrational.141 
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For instance, during the Rwandan genocide, the international community delayed the use of 
the “g-word” several weeks, even though the events screamed genocide.142  Fast forward to 
Darfur, the United States did not want to shy away from calling the situation genocide, 
although months later, the Commission, which was established to enquire whether genocide 
had happened, stated that no evidence could be found of special intent.143 The behavior of 
the international community in these situations is somewhat contradictory. 
Smith has examined the attitudes and reactions of the European governments towards 
genocide. Her studies establish that in addition to the legal norm against genocide, there is 
also a social one.144 Legal norm can be found from Article II of the Genocide Convention 
and from statutes of international tribunals. Social norm, in turn, is consistent with the moral 
perspective, and used by, for example, journalist and commentators in the public parlance.145 
To clarify the difference, by the words of Milanović, “[t]o the average lay person, genocide 
is any organized, planned mass murder of human beings on account of their race, ethnicity, 
religion or other personal characteristic.”146 Therefore, as the social norm concentrates 
more on the aspect of mass killing of all human groups without the specifics of genocide, it 
is broader than the legal norm in most parts147. This difference may well be one of the reasons 
why the Genocide Convention has faced critique for its inadequate provisions to prevent and 
punish genocide.148  
If we look more closely the differences between the legal and social norm of genocide, the 
most visible difference is, what kind of action is required or presumed from the states in the 
event of genocide. Again, the wording Genocide Convention only provides that states 
undertake to prevent and punish genocide.149 What prevention means in practice is not 
included in the Genocide Convention. It does, however, contain certain requirements for 
punishment. 
The social norm, in turn, is linked to our moral values, and therefore requires prompt reaction 
and response to the genocide. If it is not an obligation, it is a strong expectation, that states 
                                                 
142 It has been argued that the CIA had considerable knowledge about the Rwandan genocide beforehand. 
See, for example, Heinze 2007, p. 360.  
143 Smith 2010, p. 222. 
144 Smith 2010, pp. 6-7; van den Herik 2007, pp. 75-76. 
145 Smith 2010, pp. 6-7 
146 Milanović 2006, p. 557. 
147 Article II of the Genocide Convention contains also other acts beside ‘killing’.  
148 Smith 2010, pp. 6-7.  
149 Genocide Convention, Article I. 
29 
 
take all measures to stop genocide, even military force, if it is necessary.150 This can be 
concluded and deducted also from the media and press reports that have called for action in 
the case of the Rohingya.151 Alongside of the legal obligation to prevent genocide, the UN 
Framework Analysis relating to prevention also urges to prevent pursuant to the moral 
responsibility to do so.152 
The differences between the contents and the expectations of the norms are the point where 
the political will of the states comes to play. According to Heinze, denying the existence of 
genocide may well be a choice to deny the legal norm to avoid the obligations under the 
Genocide Convention to prevent and punish genocide. This was the case in the Rwandan 
genocide. There the Clinton administration officials avoided using the term genocide for as 
long as they could because of the fear that they would be obliged to act pursuant to the 
Genocide Convention. Further, supporting the social norm of genocide and appealing to the 
moral duties may also well be a justification for intervention.153 This was the case with the 
unauthorized bombings of Kosovo by the United States. 
In her studies, Smith also found other reasons for not naming genocide. These seem to 
correspond with the facts of the Rohingya crisis. Firstly, Smith argues that the debate, 
whether or not there is genocide taking place, has been transferred to the legal system. This 
means that the reluctance to use the term “genocide” is unwillingness to declare it before 
tribunals do. This also coheres with the argument that genocide as a term is stigmatized154. 
In a situation where it is unsure if the elements of genocide are existing (bearing in mind the 
standard of proof required), the “political correctness” and diplomacy wins. This kind of 
behavior is, however, quite problematic as the definitive ruling on the existence of genocide 
is received well after the genocidal events. Some see that broadening the definition of 
genocide, loosening the elements of the crime, would weaken the desired terrible stigma of 
the crime and add another difficulty to the issue of cumulative offences (concursus 
delictorum).155 
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Second reason for the inactivity of the states has been the fact that governments have been 
genuinely convinced of the existence of civil war where one side may have been nastier than 
the other, but no side was angelic. Therefore, in that situation, any activity would have meant 
taking sides. States also grounded their inactivity on the fact that invoking genocide may 
make humanitarian aid more difficult.156  
These findings of Smith, at least in some form, can be found also from the Rohingya crisis. 
Most of the international community started talking about genocide happening in Myanmar 
after the Fact-Finding Mission released its Report. Assumably, this was because of the 
impartial and well gathered evidence that did not leave room for staying passive anymore. 
There are, however, China and Russian Federation and some others that still claim that the 
mass killings in Myanmar is still a domestic issue where the international community should 
not interfere.157 
 
 Genocide v. ethnic cleaning 
 
Until the release of the Report by the Fact-Finding Mission, the Rohingya crisis was mostly 
called as ethnic cleansing, instead of genocide.158 One of the biggest controversies, that 
followed the genocides of the 1990s, was the question if ethnic cleansing constitutes 
genocide. As it will be established, these two crimes have a distinct, but intertwined159, 
meaning and diverse effects to the obligations of the international community. 
The term ethnic cleaning was used in connection with the Bosnian crisis as a reference to 
the practice of Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina when forcing the Muslims and Croats 
out of their traditional areas of settlement. This expulsion was a part of a plan to create a 
territory solely for the Serbs, which would then be united with Serbia to form a ‘Greater 
Serbia’. During such operations, civilians were massacred, sexual abuses committed, cities 
were bombarded, and personal properties destroyed and confiscated.160  
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The standard view161 is that ethnic cleansing means expulsion of a group from a specific 
territory. The ICJ stated in its judgement in 2007:  
“[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area “ethnically 
homogeneous”, nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such 
policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes 
genocide is “to destroy, in whole or in part” a particular group, and 
deportation or displacement of the members of the group, even if effected by 
force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such 
destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement.162 ” 
However, there have been also diverging views. In 1993, judge Lauterpacht argued in his 
separate reasons that ethnic cleansing was a form of genocide, because the intent was to 
destroy at least part of a group that resided in certain location.163 Schabas expressed his view 
on the matter as follows:  
“it is incorrect to assert that ethnic cleansing is a form of genocide, or even 
that in some cases, ethnic cleansing amounts to genocide. Both, of course, may 
share the same goal, which is to eliminate the persecuted group from a given 
area. While the material acts performed to commit the crimes may often 
resemble each other, they have two quite different specific intents. One is 
intended to displace a population, the other to destroy it. ”164 
This does not, however, mean that events that start as ethnic cleansing would not expand in 
genocide in the end. The ICJ further stated accordingly that ethnic cleansing may constitute 
genocide, if the acts committed fall into the scope of Article II of the Genocide Convention 
and special intent can be established.165 This view has also been seconded by Werle and 
Jessberger, who argue that ethnic cleansing describes a complex criminal phenomenon, a 
policy which implementation leads to serious human rights breaches while aiming to force 
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a group of people out of certain region to change the ethnic composition of the population. 
Whether the definition of ethnic cleansing fulfills the criteria for genocide is a complicated 
question. The blanket classification of ethnic cleansing as genocide cannot be used: the act 
plus the intent of the act does not necessarily equal in genocide.166  
What are the consequences if we choose to call a situation as ethnic cleansing versus 
genocide? Pursuant to the Genocide Convention, ethnic cleansing does not have any legal 
significance of its own and cannot be therefore prosecuted as a separate crime. However, 
this does not mean that the material elements of ethnic cleansing would not fall under the 
criteria of other mass atrocities. Above it has been established that ethnic cleansing may 
constitute genocide, if actus reus and mens rea are fulfilled. In addition, it might fulfill the 
criteria of crimes against humanity and therefore be prosecuted under that crime. But in the 
case ethnic cleansing does not amount to genocide, the obligations under the Genocide 
Convention, namely preventing and punishing genocide, cannot be invoked. This is one of 
the reasons why the international community refrains from naming genocide and lingers on 
“lesser crimes”.167 However, for the victims, genocide may represent the only adequate way 
to describe their suffering and the loss of their heritage.168 Therefore, it can be disappointing 
when their suffering is overlooked and categorized “merely” as ethnic cleansing or crime 
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4 PREVENTING GENOCIDE 
 
“Genocide is the ultimate crime and the gravest violation of human rights it is possible to 
commit. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive of a heavier responsibility for the 
international community and the Human Rights bodies of the United Nations than to 
undertake any effective steps possible to prevent and punish genocide in order to deter its 
recurrence.”169 
 
4.1 Purpose of preventing genocide  
 
The Genocide Convention recognizes the great losses on humanity by genocide and requires 
cooperation of the states for preventing genocide.170 Therefore, to understand more deeply 
the obligation to prevent, a brief look is made into the purpose behind the prevention of 
genocide. 
Most visible reason of prevention of genocide is the preservation of human life.171 As 
genocide is a large-scale event, a significant loss of human life is avoided through 
preventing. The genocide in Rwanda escalated in the death of about 800,000 Tutsi 
population172, the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission estimated that the security forces in 
Myanmar have killed 10,000 Rohingya Muslim.173 Even though the numbers are not 
equivalent, every life saved is just as valuable. But there are other reasons, too.  
The UN Security Council has recognized genocide as a threat to international peace and 
security and this view has been supported by, among others, by the ICC. 174 Preventive 
measures will therefore contribute in most cases to national peace and security, but they also 
have an effect at the international level, as genocide commonly creates tensions between 
neighboring states.175 If we look at the situation at the border of Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
this has a true ring to it. 
                                                 
169 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6. 
170 Genocide Convention, Preamble. 
171 Genocide Convention, Preamble. 
172 Smith 2010, p. 142. 
173 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para 1008. 
174 Rome Statute, Preamble. 
175 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 99. 
34 
 
Also, when comparing to punishment of genocide, prevention is less expensive measure to 
stop genocide or deal with its aftermath. Prevention enables the early engagement of the 
international community and is less exposed to political judgment calls. Through the 
preventive measures, states can reinforce their sovereignty and are in fact, fulfilling their 
responsibilities towards its citizens and international community.176 Against this purpose, 
the prevention of genocide seems the most effective way to stop genocide from taking place.   
 
4.2 Definition of prevention 
 
 Obligation to prevent under Genocide Convention 
 
International cooperation is a key requisite to prevent genocide.177 According to Article I of 
the Genocide Convention, the parties to the convention have undertaken to prevent and 
punish genocide. The wording of the said Article establishes prevention and punishment in 
the same context, but it can be concluded, for example based on the Genocide case, that the 
obligation to prevent has an independent nature.178 The relationship of the obligation to 
prevent and obligation to punish is however related to one another. For instance, using Ben-
Naftali’s example, when these obligations are put on a time line, punishment indicates that 
genocide has been committed, which, in turn, indicates the failure of the obligation to 
prevent.179 
The scope and the meaning of the obligation to prevent, as the Genocide Convention 
describes it, is, however, lacking content in the operational level. Purely sticking to the 
wording of the Genocide Convention, the obligation to punish stands out compared to the 
obligation prevent. The Genocide Convention refers explicitly, in addition to above 
mentioned Article I, to the obligation to prevent only in its Article VIII, which provides that:   
“[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
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consider appropriate of the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.”  
To compare, punishment and criminal proceedings are in the core of Articles III-VII of the 
Genocide Convention. Purely based on this comparation, it could be interpreted that the 
Genocide Convention prefers punishment as a mean of repression instead of prevention. And 
more importantly, the criminalization of genocide serves the main object of the Genocide 
Convention, not prevention.180 
Case law of the international tribunals has been very contributive in developing the concept 
of prevention of genocide. In its judgment concerning the 1951 Advisory Opinion181, the ICJ 
stated that the obligation to prevent is an independent obligation. This was further iterated 
in the judgement in 2007, where the ICJ stated that the two obligations have a close link, in 
accordance with Article I of the Genocide Convention, but the obligation of prevention has 
its own legal existence of its own, too.182 Compared to the starting point that punishing 
genocide means failing to prevent, the ICJ confirmed that firstly, there is an obligation to 
prevent, which is continued with an obligation to punish.183 
At the time of the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the content of prevention was, as 
Ben-Naftali describes it, “morally pregnant but normatively empty concept”. When looking 
at the wording of Article I of the Genocide Convention, it indeed gives little indication as to 
what it entails in concrete. However, it also has been argued by Ben-Naftali that the lack of 
precision may well be the strength of the Genocide Convention in the end, because it has 
provided a space for creative, purposeful interpretation by the international tribunals.184  
All in all, when examining the duty to prevent, it can be noticed that the Balkan crisis 
resurrected the duty to prevent genocide from the oblivion when the importance of 
prevention was recalled. Also, the setting up of the ICTY was a step to establish more 
preventive components. It was, however, the ICJ, which determined the scope and specific 
normative content of the obligation to the prevent in the Genocide case.185 
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 Scope of the obligation to prevent according to the ICJ 
 
In the 2007 judgement, the ICJ clarified the content of the obligation to prevent. The scope 
can be summarized as follows:  
The ICJ limited the ratione materiae of the obligation to prevent to genocide, as it is referred 
to in Article II of the Genocide Convention, consisting of the acts referred to in Article III 
of the Genocide Convention.186 Therefore, the term ‘prevention’, in the meaning how it is 
possibly defined in other conventions or treaties, does not apply.187 Relating to the ratione 
temporis, the ICJ held that it arises “at the instance that a state learns of, or should have 
learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed”.188 This, however, 
is applicable to the extent that genocide is ultimately carried out. Further, the court stated 
that the ratione loci of the obligation is not limited territorially. Therefore, each state has an 
obligation prevent and punish genocide.189 In 1993, judge Lauterpacht clarified the court’s 
view his separate opinion by stating that any territorial limitations would mean that a party 
obliged to prevent genocide within its own territory would not be obliged to do so in a 
territory which it invades and occupies. Limited action would thus mean permissibility of 
inactivity, which contradicts the very idea behind the Genocide Convention.190  In the 2007 
judgement the ICJ did recall the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention: the 
universal nature of condemnation of genocide and cooperation to eliminate it.191 
This all would thus mean the obligation to prevent would arise immediately when a state 
learns, or should have learned of the serious risk of genocide will be committed. The 
peremptory effect of this obligation is, however, pending on the positive ruling of genocide. 
As regards to Rohingya crisis, the events that took place in 2017 would hardly leave the 
international community unaware of the serious risk of genocide being committed. In this 
case, the international community, including Myanmar, is late in their actions. 
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 Obligation to prevent under the doctrine of due diligence 
 
In the judgment of 2007, the ICJ stated that the obligation to prevent is one of conduct, not 
of result (in the meaning that the preventive measures would be successful) and much 
depends on the circumstance of the particular case. For this purpose, the court introduced 
the concept of due diligence. This means that states must take all means reasonable available 
to prevent and must face responsibility if it manifestly fails to take all measures to prevent 
that were within its power.192  
The doctrine of due diligence was not a new invention, as the ICJ had refer to it in its earlier 
cases. For example, in the Corfu Channel case, the court stated that Albania was held 
responsible on the basis that it must have known, according to the evidence gathered, that 
the mines laid in the Corfu Strait and therefore failed to warn ships passing through the strait 
and breached its international obligation. 193 Subsequently, the ICJ has endorsed the due 
diligence doctrine in the Genocide Case.194 
In the Genocide case, the ICJ did emphasize that due diligence required assessment in 
concreto. The essence of the issue was the capacity of the state to effectively influence the 
actions of persons likely to commit genocide, which, according to the court, varied from one 
state to another and depended on many elements. These elements may be geographical 
distance of the state concerned, strength of the political and other links, between the state 
and the main actors in the genocidal links.195 However, ultimately, the obligation to prevent 
is limited to the acts permitted by international law. 
As the court put it, the scope of a state’s obligation to prevent genocide is directly 
proportionate to its ability and influence over relevant perpetrators.196 Pursuant to that 
‘classification’, Milanović has contemplated whether it would be possible generalize which 
states would be under the obligation to act with preventive measures? He recognizes three 
different situations and suggests following: Firstly, minor states would probably be obligated 
to cooperate197 with other states, above all, by diplomatic pressure. More greater powers, in 
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turn, would have to be much more active with their preventive measures and lastly, states 
which are directly involved with the events, would have even greater obligations.198 
To apply Milanović’s logic into the Rohingya crisis, it could be concluded that major 
powers, such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council, would have the 
obligation to prevent, at least because of their political strength. Geographically measured, 
Bangladesh would be one of the most obvious ones, being a cross-border neighbor and 
directly affected by the crisis. At the same time, it could be argued that Bangladesh is doing 
its share by supporting the refugee camps and negotiating on the safe repatriation of the 
Rohingya.199  
If it is true, that the obligation to prevent genocide is not limited temporally (ratione 
temporis) and that states are under a general obligation to do all in their power, through 
legislation or other measures, to prevent genocide, a temporally determinable element is still 
required. To cite Gattini, the “presence of a real and serious danger of genocide” so that the 
obligation to prevent can be concretized.200 This however raises a question whether general 
awareness of a history of hatred over the years in a certain place equals with a real and 
present danger of genocide with genocidal plan, i.e. when the situation evolves into kind that 
triggers due diligence?201  
The above-mentioned issue may be relevant also as regards to the safe repatriation of the 
Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar. Safe repatriation has also been the 
recommendation of the Advisory Commission and the Fact-Finding Mission.202 Myanmar 
and Bangladesh agreed on a new bilateral treaty basis in November 2017 of the process of 
the repatriation. Pursuant to that treaty the return of the was set to start by mid-November 
2018.203 The timing, however, seems troubling. Firstly, according to Channel NewsAsia, 
UNCHR was not involved on the agreement concerning repatriation, although it was a 
requirement under the first agreement. Secondly, the Myanmar government has not given 
any guarantees that the Rohingya will receive their citizenship when returning, or have their 
land or properties (what is left of it) back, nor that their safe return is secured. 204  Would this 
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mean that sending Rohingya back knowing that the violence may continue and there is no 
guarantee for their safety that the due diligence obligation would be triggered? 
Turning back to prevention of genocide, another relevant question is, what the states can do 
in concrete? Sanctions and cutting financial ties are alternatives, along with arms embargo. 
The Fact-Finding Mission considered in its Report that targeted individual sanctions, such 
as travel bans and asset freezes, could stop the violations of international law. Such sanctions 
should not, however, have any influence on the broader population, as it may weaken the 
conditions of the Rohingya further.205 
Gattini makes an interesting point by stating in relation to concrete measures of prevention 
that the ICJ “in a way throws doubt on their efficacy when it recognizes that the genocidal 
events ‘took a very short time’.206  This would mean that if genocidal events do not take long 
time, there would not be much chances to prevent them. However, in this context it should 
recalled that prevention of genocide is not an act of result.207 Doing nothing is a strong 
implication to the perpetrators that their acts are permissible. 
 
4.3 UN framework for prevention 
 
 The purpose of the framework 
 
To bring more flesh to the bones of obligation to prevent, the Special Advisors of Genocide 
and on the Responsibility to Protect have developed a Framework Analysis for the 
Prevention of Atrocity Crimes, including genocide. The background idea of the framework 
is to be more alert, pay more attention to the warning sign and facilitate the assessment of 
risk of genocide.208  
The UN has recognized four reasons for preventing atrocity crimes. Firstly, the most 
compelling is preserving human life in the sense of physical, psychosocial and psychological 
damages and trauma. Secondly, preventive measures also contribute to national, regional 
and international peace and stability. Thirdly, the cost of prevention is less than intervening, 
as rebuilding nations after humanitarian crises and wars requires a significant amount of 
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international support and time. Prevention is also less politically charged measure than, for 
example, the decision to intervene. Fourthly, preventive measures are considered as 
reinforcement of sovereignty of the territorial state, when it commits to prevent genocide 
targeted to its own population. Then, there is less need for the international community to 
intrude.209  
The risk factors and indicators have been divided into two categories: common and specific 
risk factors for each of the atrocity crimes. The existence such factors will increase the risk 
of occurrence of genocide or indicated its potential or probability. However, not all risk 
factors need to be present and they are not ranked in anyway.210 The very idea of the 
framework is that the earlier the risk factors to genocide are being recognized, the greater is 
the probability to succeed.211  
 
 The risk factors 
 
The common risk factors have been recognized as common to all atrocity crimes. As it can 
be seen from the Rohingya crisis, it does not always have to be a typical armed conflict that 
puts the state into such level of stress that makes it more exposed to human rights violations 
that lead eventually to atrocity crimes. When there is, for example, political instability, 
threats to security of the state are more imminent.212  
According to UN framework, also past or current serious violations of international human 
rights establishing a pattern of conduct can lead to atrocity crimes. This is emphasized by 
policies and practices of impunity for or tolerance of the violations of human rights, and/or 
of their incitement.213 The situation weakens if there are no national legal framework that 
serves protection for the people and ensure their human rights or if there is lack of an 
independent and impartial judiciary to protect these rights.214 Combining those with pursuits 
to render certain areas homogenous in their identity based on supremacy of that identity, 
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leading to “us” versus “them” construction implies higher degree of likelihood of mass 
atrocities.215 
Atrocity crimes are not easy to commit, as they need resources.216 As genocide always 
require the special intent, the use of sources, access to them and the capacity to commit 
atrocity crimes must be evaluated with other risk factors. However, in the absence of 
preventive elements, such as lack of access of UN or other international actors, lack of 
willingness to engage in dialogue217 with the international community and limited 
cooperation with human rights mechanisms, together with increased violations of various 
rights218 and hate propaganda219, the capacity to commit atrocity becomes more relevant. 
The specific risk factors to genocide are derived from the legal definition of the crime. 
Persistent intergroup tensions and discrimination together with denial of existence of a 
protected group220 are likely transfer such patterns into genocide with special intent to 
destroy221 the targeted, protected group.  
The UN Framework Analysis has existed since 2014. Almost all the early warning signs that 
have been recognized therein, are applicable to the Rohingya crisis. The legal framework of 
Myanmar does not protect the Rohingya people, the administrative structure and the power 
is at the hand of the military forces and there has been no cooperation on the side of the 
Myanmar government to respond to the concerns of the UN, to name a few. Therefore, 
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4.4 Relevance of hate speech  
 
As it has been established, the events that have taken place in Myanmar are various in kind. 
One of the issues stood out from the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission, was the amount of 
hate speech against Rohingya. Therefore, this Thesis will focus more on that part.  
The UN framework brings up as a specific risk factor for genocide, the official documents, 
political manifests, media records and other documents which imply intent or incitement to 
acts which may lead to genocide.222 Also, the Fact-Finding Mission established in its Report, 
that after examining several forms of documents and social platforms such as Facebook, it 
could be concluded that such material has contributed in shaping a public opinion on the 
Rohingya and the Muslims in general. According to the Fact-Finding Mission, a hate 
campaign against the Rohingya had been operated by few key actors such as nationalistic 
political parties, leading Buddhist monks, academics and members of the Myanmar 
government.223 In the era of social media, is worthwhile to look deeper to the relevance of 
hate speech and how it has appeared in the case of the Rohingya and others, as well. 
Public incitements are a quick way to defame the victims as a group, which creates or 
significantly increases of the risk for mass atrocities. Before 2011, the use of media and 
internet was heavily under the control of the military forces in Myanmar. After the 
liberalization, increasing access to internet and social platforms has facilitated remarkably 
from almost zero. Albeit the benefits of the liberalization in the pursuit of freedom of 
expression, association and peaceful assembly, it has also enabled the wider and faster 
distribution and spreading of hate speech. According to the Fact-Finding Mission, Facebook 
has been the main mode communication for Myanmar authorities as well.224 
The Fact-Finding Mission was provided with magazine issued in February 2012 full of anti-
Rohingya articles titled such as “Black tsunami in a pitiful disguise”, “Slow invasion” and 
“What the Rohingya is”. The last-mentioned article described the Rohingya as “latest 
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weapon of the religious extremist terrorists” that “are trying their very best to steal the 
land”.225 Also fake news was created against the Rohingya.226 
The Fact-Finding Mission also examined many public statements from a wide variety of 
government officials and representatives, including military and security forces. One of them 
stated, as translated by the Fact-Finding Mission into English, that Rohingya are going to be 
eradicated, which was followed by “[w]e don’t want to hear any humanitarian or human 
rights excuses. We don’t want to hear your moral superiority, or so-called peace and loving 
kindness.”227  
An urgent appeal had been made to Myanmar government already in July 2015 concerning 
the public incitements to kill Rohingya population. According to the appeal, it had come to 
the Special Rapporteurs’ acknowledge that a rally had been organized in a football ground 
with following agenda: “[i] won’t say much, I will make it short and direct. Number one, 
shoot and kill them! (the Rohingyas). Number two, kill and shoot them! (the Rohingyas). 
Number three, shoot and bury them! (the Rohingyas). Number four, bury and shoot them! 
(the Rohingyas). If we do not kill, shoot, and bury them, they will keep sneaking into our 
country!”228 
The material element of incitement requires that commission of genocide by the perpetrator 
is called for. Incitement does not have to be express, also euphemistic, metaphorical or 
otherwise coded language that can be nevertheless understood clearly to the addressed 
audience229. However, just provocative expressions or hate speech in general is not 
sufficient, it must appeal to commit an act referred in Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
In this context, public means an appeal made in a public place or through a medium targeted 
at the public to a non-individualizable audience.230 
The form of the public incitement can vary. For example, in relation to Rwanda genocide, 
the Hutu had taken control over the radio stations and used them to conduct an extreme hate 
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campaign against the Tutsi. One of the radio moderators, Georges Ruggiu, was found guilty 
because of his statements during various radio programs231 and a chief of an extremist 
newspaper, Hassan Ngeze, was convicted because of his statements232. Further, singer Simon 
Bikindi was found guilty because of his song lyrics, which were held as incitements to 
commit genocide.233 
Legal significance of hate speech, when it leads to committing genocide, may realize in the 
form of incitement. Incitement means, in the words of the ICTR, “encouraging or persuading 
another to commit and offence”.234 Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention states that 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide shall be punishable. The statutes of the 
international criminal tribunals also contain the same prohibition.235 This means that a 
separate form of complicity, inducing or attempt to induce, is criminalized. A completed or 
successful genocide is not required.236 
Werle and Jessberger crystallize the relevance of hate speech in different situations. 
According to them, a rule of thumb can be found when examining incitement to genocide 
and the freedom of speech. That is, the more secure the internal peace among various groups 
of a society is, the less defamatory and discriminatory statements should be interpreted as 
direct incitements to commit genocide. In contrast, if the political and social climate is 
already divided and followed by violent tensions between the groups, the likelihood for such 
statements being used as incitement to genocide is bigger.237   
 
4.5 Calling upon the competent organs of the UN 
 
According to Article VIII of the Genocide Convention a contracting party may call upon the 
competent organs of the UN to take such action under the UN Charter as they consider 
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any other act 
enumerated in Article III of the Genocide Convention. The Article itself does not establish 
any concrete actions, so therefore a closer look into the content is in order.  
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Firstly, the Article VIII does not confer to the UN organs any other functions or competence 
in addition to those already established in the UN Charter or in the Statute of the ICJ. This 
has been clarified by the ICJ.238 The nature of the Article VIII of the Genocide Convention 
is merely expository.239 Therefore, the focus is in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
The UN member states have undertaken, among other things, to act in sovereign equality, 
ensuring that they will act in accordance with principles set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. The justification for intervention can 
be found in Article 39 of the UN Charter, which provides that the UN Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of an aggression 
and shall make recommendations or decisions what measures are to be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.  
The UN Security Council has established that genocide is a threat to international peace and 
security.240 This triggers thus the applicability of the Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. 
The former Article is the basis for measures not involving the use of armed force, such as 
economic or other sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations. The latter enables the 
possible military action among others.   
So far, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, has urged the 
UN Security Council to consider imposing sanctions on Myanmar.241 Sanctions have been 
recommended by the Fact-Finding Mission also.242 So far, the UN Security Council has not 
taken upon that task. Individual countries such as United States243, Australia244 and 
Canada245 have imposed sanctions such as asset freeze and travel bans to top Myanmar 
military generals.   
The concrete effect of the sanctions is questionable and to be seen. It may be argued, 
however, that they may have had some effect in the past. Myanmar has been under the 
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sanctions before by the Western world, but they were eased when the military showed some 
willingness to make a democratic reform and hold elections and Aung San Suu Kyi was 
ultimately freed from the house arrest. As we have learned, the democratic focus has not 
been what the world thought. Quite the opposite, the country’s “moral leader” Aung San Suu 
Kyi has turned her back to protecting civilians.246 Therefore, the option to use of force seems 
more decisive alternative.  
International law is construed very much on the principle of the territorial sovereignty, which 
principle enjoys the ius cogens status. The said Article 2 (4) provides that: 
[a]ll Members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” 
Therefore, any act pursuant to Article 42 of the UN Charter is an infringement of that 
principle. This boils down to a very interesting question: as prohibition of genocide and 
territorial sovereignty are both jus cogens norms, which one wins? Ultimately, that is a battle 
for the UN Security Council to judge, as it is the one authorized, but not obliged, to allow 
the use of force.247  
It should be, however, noted that invoking Article VIII of the Genocide Convention does not 
relief states from their obligations to prevent under the Genocide Convention. States are still 
obligated to prevent or repress the commission of genocide as far as possible pursuant to the 
obligation to prevent. This has been stated by the ICJ in its 2007 judgment: “Even if and 
when these organs have been called upon, this does not mean that the States parties are 
relieved of the obligation to take such action as they can to prevent genocide from occurring, 
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5 PROTECTING AS RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
5.1 Sovereignty vs. human rights  
 
When examining the reactions of the international community towards the man-made 
catastrophes, such as wars and other crises, the debate over sovereignty versus human rights 
emerges frequently.249 The Preamble of the UN Charter contains a very noble idea to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, but being put against the atrocities that have 
happened, it shows the political dilemma: in the case where human rights are neglected by a 
state, should sovereignty and its impact on politics be privileged over the rights of the 
individuals or should we have a possibility to override it in certain cases and permit 
intervention for the purpose of protecting these fundamental values? 250 
Base for sovereignty can be found from Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which provides that 
the UN should refrain from interfering in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state. This presumable is the legal basis for the declarations of Myanmar, 
which has in several contexts, with the support of Russia and China, stated that the ‘violence’ 
in the Rakhan State is purely a domestic matter.251 This reasoning is familiar in other cases, 
too. For example, in 2005, when the UN Security Council debated on whether the crisis in 
Sudan should be referred to the ICC, the United States argued that such referral would breach 
the sovereignty and intervene in its internal affairs. What can be concluded from above is, 
that sovereignty and human rights are seen as opposite values.  
Bellamy has examined the division of sovereignty into two concepts: traditional sovereignty 
and sovereignty as responsibility. Traditional sovereignty emphasizes the right to free-
determination, whether, for example, in relation to culture or system of governance. There, 
the sovereignty is used as protection of the right to self-determination against interference in 
domestic affairs. Therefore, the threshold for such interference is set at high level.252 When 
assessing this threshold, Bellamy states that the mass murder of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda 
would most likely exceed this high level.253 To compare, simply by figures, the killing of 
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10,000 Rohingya might therefore not. In that case, sovereignty of Myanmar would override 
any human rights concerns of the Rohingya. Obviously, for the victims, this would be 
unbearable. 
The second concept of the sovereignty is sovereignty as responsibility, which has been 
inspired by Francis Deng. It entails the view that sovereignty is both rights and 
responsibilities. Simply put, the states that honor the human rights and protect their 
population are entitled to their sovereignty to the fullest. The foundation of this concept rests 
on two facts. Firstly, human rights are universal, irrevocable rights and they come before 
politics. Secondly, human rights are the primary responsibility of government in the 
protection of its population and if failed, international community will have the secondary 
right to protect.254 The concept of responsibility to protect is based on this view.  
 
5.2 Responsibility to protect doctrine 
 
 Purpose and background 
 
The doctrine of responsibility to protect (“R2P”) was a response to the wars, genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and other violence that took place in the different parts of the world in the 1990’s 
and to the subsequent deficiencies of international reactions to them.255 One of the catalysts 
that led into the doctrine, alongside the Rwandan and Balkan genocide, was the military 
intervention by the NATO in Kosovo as response to the wave of killings and forced 
expulsion after diplomacy and sanctions failed. Noteworthily, the military intervention was 
not authorized by the UN Security Council because of China’s and Russia’s vetos.256 
The Canadian government established the ICISS to strengthen the role of the UN and its 
responses to the threats of global security. The ICISS launched in 2001 an initiative, which 
is known today as the R2P. The purpose of the R2P was to break a deadlock of the UN 
concerning humanitarian intervention by redefining the sovereignty of states in terms of their 
responsibility to protect their population. To strengthen that responsibility, in the case of a 
                                                 
254 Bellamy 2009, pp. 19-23. 
255 ICISS Report, Foreword. 
256 It was claimed that the humanitarian intervention did not have any legitimacy pursuant to the Chapter VII 




failure, the international community is entitled to take over that responsibility of an 
individual state.257 This coheres with the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility. 
The fundamental question was, and seems to be still today, how should the international 
community respond to the situation where a state repeatedly breaches its obligations, 
suppress and abuse its population and is unwilling to prevent such behavior? At the 2005 
high-level UN World Summit meeting, the member states of the UN introduced the answers 
to that question in the form of R2P.258   
 
 Legal basis of the R2P 
 
In accordance with the R2P, the UN members have indeed declared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner through the UN Security Council should peaceful manners 
be inadequate and national authorities fail to protect their populations from genocide, crimes 
against humanity, ethnic cleansing and so on.259 According to Smith, this does not 
necessarily mean broadening the concept of legal norm of Genocide Convention, but it is a 
development of social norm of genocide.260  
The gist of the matter is its non-binding status. No matter how welcomed the doctrine of R2P 
has been, the legal basis of the R2P still rests in the underlying obligations of the states under 
the existing international instruments such as the UN Charter, Genocide Convention and the 
developing case law of international tribunals. Albeit the fact that the resolution concerning 
the R2P was accepted by consensus, and the political support261 can be found therein, the 
resolution is still recommendatory in its nature.262The content of the R2P should be thus 
examined against the contemporary international law.  
Firstly, sovereignty has never meant that a state could act in its territory however it wanted. 
The emergence of universal human rights has provided evidence that such rights no longer 
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are considered as domestic issues.263 Also, the establishment of international tribunals and 
emergence of universal jurisdiction have all contributed to the erosion of the traditional 
sovereignty.264 Therefore, the rationale of state sovereignty ends in favor of the state when 
its own population is being violated.  
Secondly, the law of state responsibility recognizes that certain violations of international 
law affect all states and authorizes states to respond either through claims for cessation of 
wrongful act, demands of reparation or countermeasures. These all have been included in 
the ARSIWA by the ILC.265 Breaches of these Articles would entail the obligation of states 
to cooperate on bringing the breach to an end trough lawful means and not render aid or 
assistance in maintaining the breach.266 The duty to cooperate under the ARSIWA entails 
coordinated effort by all states to countereffect the breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law through framework of UN or other competent international organization.267 
Also, before the adoption of the R2P the international community had already been 
somewhat acquainted with the obligation to cooperate and protect in the form of Article 1(3) 
and Article 44 of the UN Charter. As we can see, this is very close to the idea of collective 
responsibility under the R2P.  
Thirdly, Chapter VII of the UN Charter already empowers the UN Security Council to act if 
there is “a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of an aggression”.268 Whether 
the conflict is determined to be an international armed conflict or ‘merely’ internal armed 
conflict, it would still constitute a threat to peace according to the ICTY, which  has referred 
to the practice of the UN Security Council also in the cases of civil war or other internal 
conflicts.269 In that light, the view of the R2P being a re-characterization of the normative 
development of international law, or “old wine in new bottle”270 seems correct.271  Further, 
although Niemelä raises the collective responsibility of the international community as a 
matter as novelty of the R2P at the time of its adoption and examines the ius cogens status 
of the crime of genocide in relation to state responsibility, a reference to the judgment of 
2007 of the ICJ concerning the Balkan genocide is in order. To recall, there the court brought 
                                                 
263 Stahn 2007, p. 112. 
264 Niemelä 2008, p. 20. 
265 See Article 48(2) and Articles 49-53 of the ARSIWA 2001. 
266 Articles 48(2) and 49-53 of the ARSIWA, commentary. 
267 Article 41 of the ARSIWA, Commentary, para (3).  
268 UN Charter, Article 39.  
269 See Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic (2 October 1995), para. 29. 
270 Stahn 2007, pp. 111-117 
271 Niemelä 2008, p. 17.  
51 
 
up the wider scope of the obligation to prevent and the doctrine of due diligence that 
obligates all states.272  
It has been brought up as regards to the authority to declare the failure to protect, that it 
should be an impartial party who places the interest of common good ahead of its 
inspirational aspirations.273 While addressing the weaknesses of the UN Security Council, 
the ICISS has also suggested that the UN Security Council should be the one making the 
decisions concerning overriding of state sovereignty.274 This is because of the UN Security 
Council already has the primary responsibility under the UN Charter for peace and security 
matters.275 All in all, even though the concept of the sovereignty a as responsibility, and the 
doctrine of the R2P that followed it, entail the idea that human rights come before the 
politics, it seems that the encounter with politics is inevitable. Taken into consideration that 
Russia and China are commonly known as the countries who use their veto-rights the most, 
and would probably in the case of the Rohingya do so, such declaration would not be made 
by the UN Security Council. Therefore, the view of Bellamy is quite right when he argues 
that the more the UN Security Council is asked to adjudicate, the more its legitimacy is of 
importance.276 
 
 Prevention as an element of R2P 
 
In accordance with the ICISS Report, the R2P entails three specific responsibilities: 
responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. As has been 
established in the earlier Paragraphs of this Thesis, after the unauthorized NATO bombing 
of Kosovo, the international community hoped for clarification to the use of military 
intervention. Although the R2P contains principles relating to the use of force277, the ICISS 
elevated the responsibility to prevent as the most important dimension of the R2P, which 
responsibility shall always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated.278 This priority 
is based on two sets of issues: saving lives through prevention and shifting the attention on 
the debate concerning military interventions to the fact that effective prevention will reduce 
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the need for such military actions.279 When examining further, the R2P suggests early 
warning signs and their analysis together with political, diplomatic, economic, legal and 
military tools for the measures of prevention.280 When comparing these tools to the UN 
Framework for prevention, a similarity can be seen.281  
The ICISS strongly stated that R2P implies also obligation to prevent and that it was high 
time for the international community to act and close the gap between the rhetorical support 
and actual commitment.282 The above-mentioned prioritizing of prevention has not been, 
however, greeted without criticism. Weiss seems to be a very loud one in his opinions. He 
argues that: 
 “it is preposterous to argue that to prevent is the single most important 
priority; the most urgent priority is to react better. Most of the mumbling and 
stammering about prevention is a superficially attractive but highly unrealistic 
way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard issues of what essentially 
amounts to humanitarian intervention.”283  
Weiss further emphasizes that although the ICISS succeeded to clarify the discourse on 
prevention, it left the situation blurred on the part of those who already are in the crosshairs 
of war.284 The R2P concentrates heavily to early warning signs and analysis thereof, efforts 
to prevent root causes and direct prevention.285 Turning back to Weiss’ critique towards 
prevention, he has a valid point, which has also been supported by other scholars.286 For 
example, focusing on the killing of 10,000 Rohingyas in that actual moment it is rather late, 
bluntly put, to stop the genocidal wheels from turning through diplomacy or examining root 
causes.  
This raises the question what is the place that prevention, and rebuilding for that matter, take 
in the R2P concept?  To answer, we are in crossroads with Weiss’ and Bellamy’s argument 
that prevention and rebuilding have been added to the concept of R2P to make military 
interventions more palatable to accept “as a part of the deal” in order to prevent future 
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Rwandas and Balkans. This, in turn, distracts and threats the R2P’s conceptual clarity as 
regards to the scope of military intervention.287  
 
 Military intervention as an element of R2P 
 
The R2P implies also responsibility to react to crises of compelling need for human 
protection. External military interventions for the purposes of protecting human rights have 
been controversial both when they have happened and when they have not. The debate over 
such interventions seems to vary – some see it as a right for a good cause, others see it just 
justification for the illegal breach of principle of state sovereignty.288 
Rwanda crisis in 1994 led to inaction, although some of the UN members were aware of the 
genocide planning by the government. There were plans, if not prevent but at least mitigate 
the effects of genocide, but the UN Security refused to take necessary action.289 Further, as 
regards to Sudan, due to, among others, flawed planning and poor execution, the prevention 
of the crisis was a failure.290 In the case of Kosovo, the bypassing of UN system and 
authorization of the UN Security Council led to the question, if all the peaceful means to 
resolve the conflict had been fully explored? There the reactions to the unauthorized action 
seems to have varied from illegal to legal, but there was also a reaction “illegal but 
legitimate” 291: how could the world stand by and let genocide take place because of the 
wording of the UN Charter, when all the diplomatic paths had been, allegedly, exhausted?292  
The foreword of the ICISS Report starts by introducing the report being about “right of 
humanitarian intervention”, question of when it is appropriate to take coercive action, 
particularly in the military form. However, before getting to the point of military 
intervention, the R2P doctrine includes, in addition to preventive measures, measures short 
of military actions, such as sanctions affecting to military, economic, political and diplomatic 
areas.293 Sanctions as a preventive tool may come handy, at least when targeting the 
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individual perpetrators, but large-scale economic sanctions may worsen the situation and be 
more burdensome to the civilians than to the principal players in the genocidal acts.294 
The ICISS has recognized six criteria for military intervention: right authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.295 Just cause 
implies that military intervention is reserved for, firstly, large scale of loss of life, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is related to the territorial state either by deliberate actions, 
neglection or failure to act, and secondly, large scale ethnic cleansing as further defined in 
the ICISS Report. Naturally, this criteria is not immune to interpretation and to questions of 
evidence, either.296 
Evidence-wise, it seems that before invoking military intervention, it must be proven in each 
case that there is actual or threatened large scale human loss or ethnic cleansing taking 
place.297 That requires fair and accurate information. This then leads to the situation that 
report of a fact-finding mission is needed or information should be otherwise gathered by 
the UN organs and agencies. The challenge is that there might not be time for it.  
As for the other criteria, they seem to target the legitimacy of the military intervention (right 
intervention), which can be ensured by collective decision and support, scale and intensity 
of the military intervention (proportional means) to secure the humanitarian objective with 
minimum intervention as possible in succeeding to achieve the goal (reasonable 
prospects).298 All in all, there seems to be a long path from preventive measures to actual 
military intervention.  
 
5.3 Significance of the R2P in practice 
 
Despite of R2P, the norm of non-intervention is still the starting point. According to the 
ICISS Report, the rule against intervention to internal matters encourages the states to solve 
their own internal conflicts so that they do not form a threat to international peace and 
security.299 The distinction between primary responsibility of the territorial state and the 
                                                 
294 ICISS Report 2001, para. 4.5.  
295 ICISS Report 2001, para. 4.15. 
296 ICISS Report includes further examination of what is meant by ‘large scale’ for example. See ICISS 
Report 2001, paras. 4.21-4.27.  
297 ICISS Report para. 4.28.  
298 ICISS Report 2001, paras. 4.33-4.43. 
299 ICISS Report 2001, para. 3.2. 
55 
 
secondary responsibility of the international community entails complementarity, which 
may turn into trap according to Stahn. The collective responsibility will only take place if 
the national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. What is meant by ‘manifestly fails’ is 
left unclear. There is also the risk that the primary responsibility is used as an excuse to 
decline the secondary responsibility by arguing that the international community is not either 
competent or entitled to intervene or the intervention is premature300. Further, the 
implications of inaction, whether by the territorial state or the international community, is 
also missing from the R2P.  Also, there are no implication what non-compliance would mean 
for the UN Security Council. This also emphasizes the fact that the R2P is more a political 
principle than legal one.301 
Another issue that has been brought up by Evans, is the argument that R2P only applies to 
weak and friendless countries, and never the strong. For example, if the crisis at hand would 
concern the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the fear is that the veto powers 
would block the use of R2P.302 Further examining this argument, he, however, concludes 
that in today’s world no country, no matter how big and powerful, would be immune to peer 
group pressure and that the concern of losing the international image would contribute to the 
problem solving more effectively.303 This argument has not worked in the case of Myanmar, 
which has had China and Russia as strong supporters in the debated that the Rohingya crisis 
is just internal violence.304 
The abovementioned issue has been recognized by the ICISS as well. In its report, it duly 
noted the veto powers of the UN Security Council members and suggested a “code of 
conduct” for the use of veto with respect to actions required to halt or avert a significant 
humanitarian crisis, at least in matters where there are no vital national interests involved.305 
Notwithstanding with the concern of veto powers, the ICISS however believed the UN 
Security Council was the right authority to deal with military intervention issues for human 
protection purposes.306 
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So far, the examples of R2P being used concentrate mostly to the African continent. In 
practice, the first time when the UN Security Council officially referred to the R2P was in 
April 2006 in its resolution.307 Further, referring to said resolution the UN authorized its 
peacekeeping troops to Darfur.308 Later, the R2P has been referred to in the conflict in Libya 
in 2011, which also led to the NATO strikes against Qadhafi’s forces, in Côte d’Ivoire in 
2011, which led to the military operation by the UNOCI and in Syria in 2012.309 
Although use of force can be a powerful tool for solving crises, they may have repercussions 
as well. As Niemelä points out, interventions can also increase and accelerate the violence 
or other potential hazards, prolong and escalate the conflict so that it will endanger the 
conditions of the people that it is designed to help.310   
 
6  PUNISHING GENOCIDE 
 
“I do not see any justice for us. Justice was never there in Myanmar. It is just that now the 
situation is more in focus because of the extreme levels of the violence.311” 
 
6.1 Purpose of punishment 
 
The link between the protection fundamental values of international community and legal 
order is international criminal law. In international criminal law, the purpose of punishment 
is “borrowed” from the ordinary domestic criminal law: it serves justice and retribution. In 
addition, the preventive element of punishment, deterrence, is important.312  
This has been the view of the UN Security Council as well. It stated, when creating the 
ICTY, that the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators would contribute to 
preventing future crimes.313 This has been seconded by the ICTY itself by stating in 
Kupreskic et al. case that “[t]he Trial Chamber is further of the view that another relevant 
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sentencing purpose is to show the people of not only former Yugoslavia, but of the world in 
general, that there is no impunity for these types of crimes.314” However, taking into 
consideration that the punishment of the perpetrators takes place in the aftermath of the 
genocidal acts, May has questioned, whether holding criminal trials is the best way to gain 
reconciliation and the return to the rule of law instead of truth and reconciliation 
commissions.315 
As in criminal law in general, also the international criminal law acknowledges two forms 
of preventive effects: positive general prevention and positive special prevention. For 
example, the Rome Statute, pursuant to which the ICC was established, states that the aim 
of the ICC is to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.316 This means contribution to stabilize the 
norms of international law to the extent that the punishment is understood as a fact that 
international law is law and any breaches will be punished. The target of the positive special 
preventive effect, in turn, is an individual (potential) perpetrator itself.317  
Werle and Jessberger brings up two other specific effects of prosecuting crimes under 
international law. First, the trials have a truth-seeking aspect. Convictions constitute an 
official acknowledgement of injustice and of victim’s suffering. Secondly, prosecutions 
individualize the responsibility. There, it is not the abstract entities that commit the atrocities, 
it is the collaboration of real people. Individualization gives faces to the perpetrators, 
observes their individual acts so that they cannot hide behind the curtain of a state machinery. 
Werle and Jessberger calls it refuting the idea of collective responsibility.318 
The critics of the international tribunals have targeted the fact that judgments are of 
retroactive nature: decisions of prosecution are often made when the crisis is already 
underway, or even when the crime is committed. This kind of retroactivity is not, however, 
deviant from the process at the domestic level, when considering, for example, a murder. 
What is different, is that in the field of international criminal law, the national law prohibiting 
genocide may not be in place or the jurisdiction of the ICC is not applicable to the matter at 
hand.319 This is the case with Myanmar, as will be later established. 
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6.2 Enacting national legislation 
 
In a decentralized international legal system, domestic implementations of criminal acts lie 
in the frontline in the combat against genocide.320 In accordance with Article V, the 
contracting parties are obliged to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention 
and provide effective penalties for the persons guilty of the acts prohibited by the 
Convention.321 The problem with this Article is that the Genocide Convention does not have 
any supervision on the state fulfilling nor not this obligation.322  
In the Genocide case the ICJ examined the questions relating to Article V of the Genocide 
Convention. There the court observed that “undertake” as a term means giving formal 
promise, agreeing and accepting an obligation.323 Therefore, understandably, the court found 
that breach of the obligation under Article V and related provisions invokes state 
responsibility. This was the conclusion also in the case of not prosecuting and extraditing 
alleged offenders.324 
As Myanmar has ratified Genocide Convention, it is under an obligation to criminalize, in 
accordance with its Constitution, genocide under its domestic laws. According to the report 
of the Fact-Finding Mission, neither genocide nor crimes against humanity have been 
criminalized specifically in Myanmar.325 Further, the Constitution of Myanmar is 
problematic particularly in relation to the fact that the Rohingya are de facto stateless – it 
serves human rights protection only to citizens. The power and influence of the military 
forces has an effect these practices and weakens the judicial administration and the 
investigations relating to alleged crimes even more.326  
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6.3 International criminal jurisdiction over genocide 
 
 Territorial jurisdiction 
 
According to Article VI of the Genocide Convention, persons charged with genocide shall 
be tried by a competent tribunal of the territorial state of which the act was committed, or by 
such international tribunal that has jurisdiction with respect of the contracting parties to the 
Genocide Convention, which have accepted the jurisdiction.327 The Genocide Convention 
therefore suggests territorial jurisdiction as a first instance.  
The principle behind the territorial jurisdiction is that every state has the authority to define 
the scope of its national criminal jurisdiction as a part of the state sovereignty. This has, 
however, created problems. Due to the concept of sovereign power and the principle of non-
interference, mass atrocities, however illegal, have been long unpunished as the enforcement 
had been left to the territorial state. Territorial jurisdiction is not seen, therefore, the most 
successful mean to bring justice, as the crime of genocide is often state-sponsored by the 
government against its own civilians and has therefore led to impunity.328 
What comes to the punishment of crimes and violations executed against the Rohingya, the 
reality is that up to the date of the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission, no actions have been 
taken towards ensuring accountability by Myanmar.329 So far, Myanmar has stated that it 
will act against anyone if there is sufficient evidence presented.330 Myanmar’s position is, 
however, lacking grounds. According to the Mission, the duty to ensure accountability is not 
linked to the presentation of sufficient evidence by others. Myanmar is and has been, 
therefore, under the obligation to promptly, thoroughly, independently and impartially to 
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 Universal jurisdiction 
 
“International crimes are not domestic matters”.332 The reasoning behind that statement is 
that the effects of crimes directed against the most elementary values of the international 
community cannot be limited to the domestic realm of a state where the crime was 
committed.333  
Under international law, the question of authority to prosecute and punish crimes, is one of 
hierarchy. The feasibility and principle argue for the primary obligation of a directly affected 
state.334 In the context of the territorial jurisdiction, as it can be concluded from the 
statements of Myanmar, the impunity at the domestic level is not, most likely, achieved, and 
so the accountability must be established from the international level.  
The establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has 
developed the international criminal law as the jurisdiction of both tribunals is based on the 
right of all states to assert jurisdiction over the alleged atrocities on the ground of universal 
jurisdiction.335 Because of that, judicial bodies in third states have asserted jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.336 For example, as regards to the 
former Yugoslavia, Denmark and Switzerland have prosecuted perpetrators.337  
There is, however, some debate whether the crime of genocide is subject to universal 
jurisdiction because of the wording of Article VI of the Genocide Convention. The said 
Article provides that:  
“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with 
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” 
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As the universal jurisdiction has not been mentioned in the Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention, it could be argued that the territorial jurisdiction is exclusive.338 This does not, 
however, hinder the applicability of universal jurisdiction.  
The ICJ has stated in its judgment of 1996 that the contracting parties to the Genocide 
Convention have expressly agreed to the wording of Article I of the Genocide Convention 
and therefore, they acknowledge that genocide is a crime under international law, which they 
must prevent and punish independently of the situation in which genocide takes place. The 
ICJ further stated that the Genocide Convention is applicable, without reference to the 
circumstances linked to the domestic or international nature of the conflict, provided that the 
acts committed are those enumerated in Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention. In 
other words, whether the conflict is domestic or international, the obligations of the state 
parties stay the same.339 
All in all, universal jurisdiction is welcomed. It serves a complementary mean to end 
impunity and creates comprehensive network of jurisdictional claims for international 
claims. Albeit some dangers, such as abuses of international legal system via (politically 
loaded) interventions and growing number of possible competing prosecution claims, 
excessive domestic prosecutions have not yet occurred. The key matter to keep in mind, is 
that the purpose of universal jurisdiction is to avoid loopholes in the prosecution of 
international crimes, such as genocide. This aim both adequately justifies and restraints the 
use of universal jurisdiction. It respects the state sovereignty as it does not replace primary 
jurisdiction, it is more of a “last resort”. Only if the territorial jurisdiction is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute, third states may initiate prosecution based on universal jurisdiction.340 
In addition, the validity of the universal jurisdiction is acknowledged under customary 
international law for genocide.341  
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Enabling the setting up of an international criminal tribunal by the Convention can be seen 
both as a necessity when the territorial courts would not prosecute, and as an alternative 
judicial body in the cases where the territorial court would not be able to try the 
perpetrators.342 For almost fifty years, there was no international tribunal in the meaning of 
Article I of the Genocide Convention. This changed in the 1990s through the establishment 
of ICTY and ICTR by the UN Security Council. After the establishment of some quasi-
international tribunals, the statute of the ICC was adopted in 1998.343 Also, the Report of the 
Fact-Finding Mission suggested that the case of the Rohingya should be examined by the 
ICC. 
 
6.4 Invoking individual liability 
 
Under general international law, the violations of such law can only affect the state, not the 
individual. To compare, the international criminal law differs from the above by individual 
liability. International criminal law thus provides the set of international rules designated to 
proscribe international crimes and the obligation of states to prosecute and punish those 
crimes.344 The relevant treaties and conventions, such as the Genocide Convention, focus on 
prohibiting certain acts, rather than addressing directly their criminal consequences. 
Although the Statutes of international criminal tribunals establish various classes of crimes 
that are punished, those are rather seen as classes over which the respective court has 
jurisdiction than as a criminal code.345 
The Nuremberg trials after the Second World War is considered as a turning point for the 
development of individual criminal responsibility. There the tribunal made the infamous 
statement that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”346 Therefore, the Genocide Convention is considered to have 
continued to ensure the criminal accountability of persons committing genocide.347 
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The ICC carries a promise for international justice and is considered as having a pivotal role 
in the strengthening and developing international criminal liability after the ICTR and the 
ICTY.348 Likewise the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute also acknowledges the individual 
criminal liability. According to Article 25 of the Rome Statute, person who commits a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for 
punishment with the Statute. As it can be seen from the said Article, the individual criminal 
liability does not only attach to those who commit the crime but also to those who facilitate 
the commission by, for example, aiding and abetting.349 Moreover, Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute establishes that the official position of the perpetrator shall not relieve the criminal 
responsibility of such persons nor mitigate the punishment. Therefore, no matter at what 
level the person is in hierarchy, the criminal responsibility cannot be avoided.  
In its Report, the Fact-Finding Mission argued for charging the Myanmar military leaders, 
Commander-in-Chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing and five other commanders, for 
genocide, as the events could not have happened without the knowledge of military 
leadership and their effective control. By naming the highest level of command, the Fact-
Finding Mission is seeking to underline their responsibility for crimes committed.350  
 
6.5 International Criminal Court  
 
 Role of the ICC 
 
After the entry into force of the UN Charter, the states committed in the Genocide 
Convention to the establishment of an “international penal tribunal”.351 Also, the genocidal 
events around the world have verified the need for a permanent international criminal court. 
In the absence of such court, many of the atrocities have left unpunished. The establishment 
of the ICC responded to that need.352  
It can be concluded that the existence of the ICC is thus an objective fact. The UN member 
states have agreed to reaffirm their commitment to the rule of law and its fundamental 
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importance for political dialogue and cooperation among the international community. The 
states have committed to investigate, appropriately sanction and bring the perpetrators to 
justice through national, regional or international mechanisms in accordance with the 
international law.353 The UN Security Council has also emphasized the states’ responsibility 
to comply with their obligations to end impunity to “prevent violations, avoid their 
recurrence and seek sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation”.354 
The most significance distinction between the ICC and other international criminal 
institutions is the Prosecutor’s freedom to elect what “situations” are taken for investigation 
and trial. This is called the proprio motu of the Prosecutor.355 To compare, the scopes of the 
ICTY and ICTR jurisdiction, respectively, have been designated by the UN Security 
Council, namely being the genocidal acts within the Bosnian and Rwandan territory. 
According to Schabas, the ICC has been created with autonomous authority to identify those 
crisis and conflicts to which it focuses. As Meron states, the international community needed 
a uniform and definite corpus of international law that was not dependent of politics and 
which scope was international atrocities everywhere and which recognized the role of all 
states in the vindication of such law.356 The only political factor lies in the hands of the UN 
Security Council, if it decides to refer a situation the Prosecutor.357  
In the Rohingya case, the first and primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes 
under international law lies with the national authorities of Myanmar. Recurrent statements 
of Myanmar and evidence gathered by the Fact-Finding Mission have, however, proven that 
Myanmar is unwilling to engage any such process.358 As the criminal accountability at the 
domestic level will not be achieved, it is the task of the international community to come 
forward. Justifications for international trials are both deontological and practical. On one 
hand, as atrocity crimes affect the international community as a whole, they should be 
condemned internationally. On the other hand, international crimes usually create security 
concerns, threat regional stability and cause cross-border movement by the refugees. 
National courts can also be politized, corrupted or biased.359 This is also accurate in the case 
of the Rohingya. The Report of the Fact-Finding Mission clearly establishes that the national 
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authorities have been involved in the discrimination and have repeatedly left the breaches of 
human rights unpunished.360 
 
 Jurisdiction of the ICC 
 
To recall the content of Article VI of the Genocide Convention, it states that persons charged 
with genocide shall be tried by, in addition to the territorial one, such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to the contracting parties that have accepted 
its jurisdiction.361 The question is, does the ICC then fulfill the requirement in the Genocide 
Convention?  
Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut took a stand on this matter in his Minority Opinion by 
affirming that the ICC constitutes an international penal tribunal in the meaning of Article 
VI.362 He found support to his view from the ICJ’s Genocide case, where the court held that 
“notion of an ‘international penal tribunal’ within the meaning of Article VI must at least 
cover all international criminal courts created after the adoption of the Convention (at which 
date no such court existed) of potentially universal scope, and competent to try the 
perpetrators of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.363 Although, in 
that case, the ICJ was examining the role of ICTY, judge de Brichambaut concluded that, as 
the Rome Statute contains the exact same definition of genocide as Article II of the Genocide 
Convention, it qualifies as an international penal tribunal within the meaning of Article VI 
of the Genocide Convention.364 Therefore, as being a permanent institution, the ICC has the 
capacity to investigate immediately when its jurisdiction is triggered.  
To examine the jurisdiction of the ICC, the answer is found from Article 13 of the Rome 
Statute. According to said Article, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a 
crime in three cases: firstly, if a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a state party (Article 
13(a)), secondly, if the situation is referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Article 13(b)) and thirdly, if the Prosecutor has 
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initiated an investigation in respect a crime in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
(Article 13(c)). 
There are, however, preconditions on the use of such jurisdiction as set in Article 12 of the 
Rome Statute. Articles 13(a) and 13 (c) state that in order for the ICC to use its jurisdiction, 
if one or more of following states are either parties to the Rome Statute or have accepted its 
jurisdiction: the state on the territory of which the crime is committed or the state of which 
the person accused of the crime is a national. This implies that compared to state referral and 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu, the referral of the situation by the UN Security Council creates 
jurisdiction. 
The problem that arises with the Rohingya crisis is that, as at the date, Myanmar is not a 
party to the Rome Statute365, and based on its statements concerning the crisis, neither it will 
most likely accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, although it has been one of the suggestion of 
the Fact-Finding Mission.366 Therefore, noting the wording of Article 12 of the Rome 
Statute, it seems that the only alternative to bring the perpetrators to ICC would be the 
referral of the situation by the UN Security Council to the Prosecutor of the ICC. 
 Jurisdiction on the base of referral by the Security Council  
 
As it has been established in the previous chapter, the jurisdiction of the ICC, in general, is 
restricted to crimes committed within the territory or by a national of either state party or a 
state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC in a particular case. In addition to situations 
described above, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute, if a situation, in which crimes enumerated in Article 5 are committed, is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII367 of the UN Charter. 
The jurisdiction of the ICC on these matters therefore targets the crimes committed on the 
territory of non-party states. Although the situation is referred to the ICC by the UN Security 
Council, the ratione temporis of the ICC is still limited to crimes committed after the entry 
of the force of the Rome Statute (1 July 2002).368 
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As the ICC is not created by the UN Security Council, it is, in principle, free from the control 
and politics of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. But in the case of 
referral, the jurisdiction of the ICC therefore flows from the powers of the UN Security 
Council, which may take any authoritative action as regards to any UN member state in order 
to maintain and secure peace.369  
What is noteworthy, that the UN Security Council is not obligated to refer cases to the ICC 
pursuant to the Rome Statute, it cannot empower or mandate the UN Security Council to do 
anything.370 It is thus a possibility. The wording of Article 13 of the Rome Statute provides 
that firstly, there is a certain threshold to referrals as the “one or more crimes” is required to 
have been committed and secondly, that the UN Security Council acts under the Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. Pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may decide 
the measures taken if there is a threat to peace. Moreover, even if the UN Security Council 
decides on the referral, the Prosecutor still holds the proprio motu in the situation and is not 
obligated to proceed. This refusal may be executed on the basis that the investigation or 
prosecution would be in contrary of justice.371 
After what has been examined by this Thesis, it is safe to say that genocide fulfills the 
threshold of Article 13 for the referral. Genocide is a large-scale crime which is committed 
with special intent, considered even by the ICC as one of the most serious crimes of concern 
of the international community and a threat to peace in accordance with the UN Charter. The 
problem with the referrals by the UN Security Council seems not be the excess use of it, 
rather it is the non-action or late-action, as in the case of Sudan.372  
Considering that the UN Charter give to the UN Security Council primary responsibility to 
protect international peace and security373, it could be argued that the UN Security Council 
should act when there is a threat to peace, breach of peace or acts of aggression in accordance 
with Article 39 of the UN Charter. This is not, however, the case. 
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The Fact-Finding Mission recommended in its Report that the UN Security Council would 
refer the situation in Myanmar without delay.374 At the moment, this seem quite unlikely 
based on the following lack of unanimity. There have been, however, efforts made to pursuit 
the referral. In October 2018, the Head of the Fact-Finding Mission addressed the UN 
Security Council to reiterate the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Report. 
The briefing of the UN Security Council was, however, preceded by a procedural vote after 
receiving objections from China and Russian Federation among few others. The result was, 
that the briefing was approved by nine votes in favor. Among others, United States, France 
and United Kingdom were states affirming that massive destruction had taken place in 
Myanmar, which had relevance to the international peace and security. China and Russia 
were, unsurprisingly, against it.375 These responses mirror their reactions which had come 
forth already in the media earlier.376 When examining the of the standings of China and 
Russian Federation further, it can be concluded from their Press Releases that they were 
grounding their objection on the initiatives and progress being made to resolve the country-
specific problems in the Rakhine State by those engaging with the Myanmar Government. 
These facilitators include China, who has acted as link between Myanmar and 
Bangladesh.377 
China’s and Russia’s support for Myanmar has not been unnoticed by the international 
community. For example, the diplomatic pressure of the China against Bangladesh and 
Myanmar is due to the fact that it has economic and geostrategic interest in Myanmar and is 
also a major investor in Bangladesh.378 Russia, in turn, has brought up several times that it 
seconds the Myanmar government’s view that the Fact-Finding Mission’s Report is “raw 
and biased” and that the situation should be solved though bilateral negotiations between 
Myanmar and Bangladesh. Interestingly, also the double administrative work of the UN 
organs was brought up in the objections.379  
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Even though the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission are now being supported by the United 
States, France and United Kingdom – all three being permanent members of the UN Security 
Council – there are still China and the Russian Federation that can use their veto powers in 
the discussions that may follow and protect Myanmar from any action. This is also what the 
media suspects to happen.380 
However, referring the Rohingya case to the ICC would not be the first time that the UN 
Security Council has used this right. Upon establishing the report on violations or 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur, the International 
Commission of Inquiry also called the for prosecution of the crimes. As in the case of 
Myanmar, Sudan was not a party to the Rome Statute, and thus the suitable mechanism to 
trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC was referral pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute.381 In relation to Rohingya crisis, should the UN Security Council decide on referral, 
the Prosecutor would unlikely use its proprio motu to refuse such referral. As the following 
chapter will establish, the Prosecutor has already indicated the interest on the Rohingya 
crisis.  
 
 Prosecutor’s request to investigate concerning the Rohingya case 
 
In accordance with Article 19(3) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may use its proprio 
motu and seek a ruling from the court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility of 
the court. In the Rohingya case, the Prosecutor used this possibility and filed a Request 
pursuant to the said Article. The Prosecutor’s aim was to seek a ruling from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber whether the ICC could exercise jurisdiction based on Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome 
Statute.382 Somewhat surprisingly, the focus of the Prosecution’s Request was the 
deportation383 of the Rohingya people across the international border from Myanmar into 
Bangladesh. While the Prosecution’s Request acknowledged the fact that relevant 
deportations have taken place on the territory of Myanmar, which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, it manifested that the jurisdiction of the ICC could, however, be invoked on the basis 
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that the essential legal element of the crime, namely crossing the border, occurred on the 
territory of Bangladesh, which is a party to the Rome Statute.384 The Prosecution’s Request 
referred to Article 12(2)(a), pursuant which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if the state 
on the territory of which the conduct took place is a party to the Rome Statute.385  
The Prosecutor’s request in unordinary on two accounts. Firstly, the request asks for the 
court to interprete the content of Article 12(2)(a) so that its ‘traditional’ territorial principle 
is broadened as ‘partly territorial’ and secondly, it seems to be the first time that the 
Prosecutor has seek for a ruling under Article 19(3).386 However, it should be noted the 
Prosecutor did not go further, the Request did not refer to any other crimes committed in 
Myanmar.  
It is not surprise that following the Prosecution’s Request, the government of Myanmar 
declined to engage with the ICC through any formal means. In its press release Myanmar 
held that the actions of the Prosecution were an attempt to circumvent the spirit of Article 
43 of the VCLT387, evasion of the need for further investigations and lack of respect of 
Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and pursuit jurisdiction at the cost of a setting 
a dangerous precedent for non-party states being litigated in the future.388  
The Myanmar government also appealed to the bilateral agreement between itself and 
Bangladesh for the repatriation of the Rohingya and to the Memorandum of Understanding 
with UNDP and UNHCR for the coordinating and harmonizing humanitarian and 
development action in Rakhine State in order to guarantee the voluntary, safe and dignified 
return of the displaced Rohingya who have been duly verified as residents of Myanmar.389 
The latter argument sounds hardly convincing as there is no guarantees existing for safe 
patriation as at the date hereof.390 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC examined the Prosecution’s Request and established in 
its decision on 6 September 2018 that deportation initiated in a state not party to the Rome 
Statute (through expulsion or other coercive acts) and completed in a state party to the Rome 
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Statute (by the Rohingya crossing the border over Bangladesh) falls in the scope of Article 
12(2)(a). Thus, the ICC has a jurisdiction over the alleged crime, provided that such 
allegations are proven to the required threshold.391 On that basis, the Prosecutor started the 
investigations on the matter that are pending as at the date hereof.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber did not, however, stop its considerations over jurisdiction there. It 
also took a stand that the ICC’s rationale behind the determination of jurisdiction in relation 
to the crime of deportation may also apply to other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
as well. If it was established that at least an element of another crime (or part of it) within 
the jurisdiction is committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute, 
the ICC might lay claim of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.392 
The Pre-Trial Chamber used persecution in the meaning of Article 7(1)(h)393 of the Rome 
Statute as an example: if it was established to the applicable threshold that the deportation 
of the Rohingya people took place on any grounds enumerated in Article 7(1)(h), the ICC 
might have jurisdiction over persecution as crime against humanity pursuant to Article 
12(2)(a), considering that the element of crime of deportation (crossing border) took place 
in a state party (Bangladesh).394 
Even though the Prosecutor’s Request and the subsequent Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision has 
been welcomed for many reasons, there has also been issues that might cause divergent 
reactions. The Fact-Finding Mission stated in its Report that danger of possible ruling on the 
basis of the Prosecutor’s Request is that it leads to partial accountability and leaves other 
crimes unpunished. That would be unbeneficial to many Rohingya victims.395 Further, while 
affirming the jurisdiction over international crimes occurring partly within the state party 
territory, the affected non-party states, such as Myanmar, will not most certainly contribute 
to or cooperate in the investigations that follow. Moreover, broadening the scope too much 
by suggesting that under certain circumstances the Rome Statute may have effects on states 
that are not party to the Statute, may, in the worst case, lead to unratifications of the Statute. 
This would not be contributive to the prevention of future genocides. 
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6.6 Invoking state responsibility 
 
 Relationship with individual criminal liability 
 
Even though genocide is understood as a crime, which cannot be executed without 
involvement of a state, individuals have been found guilty for genocide by the international 
tribunals despite of the state has not been held responsible for the crime. Since the creation 
of the ICTY and the ICTR by the UN Security Council, much of the developments of 
international criminal law dealt with individual liability, and not state responsibility.396 A lot 
of hope was therefore vested in the ICJ’s judgement of 2007, where the court ruled that the 
Genocide Convention includes, even though it is not expressly stated, an obligation of a state 
not to commit genocide. The ICJ based it arguments to the interpretation of Article I of the 
Genocide Convention and to the undertaking “to prevent and punish” genocide. According 
to the court, the undertaking was not to be read as a mere introduction but as a distinct 
obligation.  Therefore, the court came into conclusion that the obligation to prevent implies 
also the obligation not to commit genocide and in addition to the individual criminal liability, 
the Genocide Convention also implies state responsibility. This means that both states and 
individuals may have simultaneous responsibility for the breach of their obligations under 
international law.397  
State responsibility is not unfamiliar issue per se as regards to the Genocide Convention. 
The history of the state responsibility relates to the formation of the UN and appears also in 
the coeval preparatory works of the Genocide Convention. In the drafting phase of the 
Genocide Convention there were few states that were supported the view of the United 
Kingdom that state responsibility should be included in the Convention. However, that view 
was defeated by a thin majority, more due to its formulation than the very existence of it.398  
Although the individual liability and state responsibility are co-existing and complementary, 
they do not assume each other.399 The laws of state responsibility and criminal law differs 
also in their legal consequences. As criminal individual liability aims for punishment, 
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deterrence and prevention, state responsibility aims to remedy and repair situation so that it 
conforms with international law.400  
 
 The concept of state responsibility 
 
The ILC codification project of the law on state responsibility culminated in the 2001 
ARSIWA. The essential premise of the ARSIWA, the concept of state responsibility itself, 
is entailed in Article 1, which provides that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.” The commentary of the ARSIWA 
reveals that whether there has been an internationally wrongful act, depends on the 
requirements of the obligation which is breached, whether that obligation raises from a 
treaty, a custom or a peremptory norm or a combination of those, and the framework 
conditions for such act.401 Further, the act or omission must be attributable to the state.402  It 
is therefore the rules of attribution that may arise the question of state responsibility. If 
requirements for attribution are fulfilled, then we have a situation where individual and state 
responsibility are concurrent.403  
The question of state responsibility as regards for international crimes was controversial 
during the codification process of the ARSIWA. Article 19 of the draft articles that preceded 
the ARWSIWA included specifically a concept of international crimes of states. The Article 
was, however, abandoned.404 Therefore, the nature of state responsibility, as is known today, 
is not criminal but civil, deriving from the customary rules of attribution.405 Although 
genocide as a crime against ius cogens entails an aggravated regime of state responsibility 
according to Articles 40 and 41 of the ARSIWA, the said Articles seem to target more the 
obligations of third states in responding to a breach. Milanović further argues that Articles 
40 and 41 are not a terminological substitute for state criminality but “a fundamental 
rejection of the notion of a different kind of responsibility of states, whose legal nature 
remains the same even if the norms violated form the very firmament of the international 
legal order.”406 This means that the status of ius cogens and erga omnes does not serve much 
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more to the scope of state responsibility. All it can bring to the table, is a basis to take 
collective action to halt such breach.407  
As regards to state responsibility, there are two separate issues. Firstly, whether the state has 
breached its obligations to prevent genocide and secondly, whether the state itself has 
committed genocide. When examining the latter, the rules of attribution, as they are 
described in the ARSIWA and clarified by the international tribunals, apply. This is due to 
the fact that a be responsible for genocide, even though it cannot commit genocide as such. 
The ultimate perpetrator is always the individual. The basis to the state responsibility is the 
attribution of the act of the individual to the state.408 
 
6.7 International Court of Justice 
 
 Jurisdiction of the ICJ as regards to genocide 
 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN409 and was established in 1945. The basis 
for the jurisdiction of the ICJ can be found from Article 36 of its Statute, which states that 
the jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties refer it and all matters 
specially provided in the UN Charter or in the treaties and conventions in force. In addition, 
the compulsory jurisdiction is provided in Article 36(2) of the Statute. What is noteworthy, 
the ICJ cannot impose criminal sanctions to individuals. 
Genocide is unique crime also in the sense that Article IX of the Genocide Convention 
explicitly confers to the ICJ the jurisdiction to adjudicate the  
 “[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the 
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of 
any of the parties to the dispute.”410 
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The Article can be considered as special modality for the UN to act, in the meaning of Article 
VIII of the Genocide Convention, for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. 
Further, because of the involvement of the ICJ, it can be considered as enhancing the 
prospects to enforce effectively the provisions of the Genocide Convention or at least, raising 
awareness of the breaches of the Convention.411 
What are the implications of Article IX then?  Firstly, as can be seen from the wording of 
the Article IX, its nature is not mandatory as it suggests that cases shall be submitted to the 
ICJ “at the request” by any of the contracting parties. This means that the ICJ does not 
investigate matters proprio motu.412 In general, the aim of these kind of compromissory 
clauses have been to strengthen the treaty by providing a guarantee for its proper application 
and to promote the rule of law.413 However, as regards to the Genocide Convention, 
settlement of a dispute is hardly imposed and guaranteed, if it only guarantees a possible 
forum to the settlement. Therefore, on one hand, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is secondary in 
the sense, that the contracting party is entitled, but not obliged, to invoke it. On the other 
hand, the Article IX grants the court the mandatory jurisdiction to which all state parties to 
the Genocide Convention are subjected, but only if the state parties have not inserted 
reservations to the application of the Article.414  
Secondly, although there are five primary sources of international law415 by which the ICJ 
decides the disputes submitted to it, the Article IX of the Genocide Convention refers to only 
one of them – the convention itself. Therefore, the ICJ, when the case is submitted to it by 
the said Article, has jurisdiction limited only to decide disputes between the contracting 
parties relating to the interpretation, application and fulfillment of the Genocide Convention, 
and of that only.416  
Thirdly, the court’s jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention does not allow trials for 
state responsibility in any other crime than genocide. This means that crimes that do not 
amount to genocide but are still mass atrocities in the meaning of crimes against humanity 
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are left unpunished even though, for example, the killings would be attributable to the state, 
but the special intent could not be proved to the necessary level. This is also applicable to 
jus cogens norms, which have an erga omnes dimension.417 In this way, the justice for the 
victims of crimes, that are of “lesser” nature than genocide, is not done.  
 
 Possible jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Rohingya case 
 
As it can be concluded from Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ to hear disputes under Article IX of the Genocide Convention is limited to the parties 
that have ratified the Genocide Convention. Also, the state parties must have ratified or 
acceded to the ICJ Statue pursuant to Article 35(1) of the ICJ Statute. Against these 
requirement, Myanmar has ratified the Genocide Convention on 14 March 1956418 and it has 
been a party to the ICJ Statute since 19 April 1948419. 
For the jurisdictional path to open to the ICJ, the relevant question is, whether the state has 
made reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which play a role in the 
possible proceedings. Tams brings up two reasons for reservations. Firstly, states that are 
concerned of being judicially scrutinized have seen fit to add reservations to Article IX to 
exclude the competence and jurisdiction of the ICJ. Secondly, it relates to the clarification 
by the ICJ that the Genocide Convention invokes also state responsibility in addition that of 
individual.420   
The status of the reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention is quite strong. In 
the Advisory Opinion in 1951 the ICJ stated that the reservations to the Genocide 
Convention are permissible, unless they are not in contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention.421 In the judgement concerning Congo and Rwanda, the ICJ further held that 
the reservation422 made by Rwanda to Article IX, submitted at the time of its accession to 
                                                 
417 Genocide case (Judgement of 26 February 2007), para. 147.The court stated that it has “no power to rule on 
alleged breached of other obligations [….], even if the alleged breaches are of obligations under peremptory 
norms, or of obligations which protect essential humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes”.  
418 See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
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420 Tams 2014, pp. 295-296.  
421 Advisory Opinion, Reservations to Genocide Convention (28 May 1951), para. 22 
422 The reservation read as follows: “The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as bound by article IX 
of the Convention”. Rwanda has withdrawn the reservation in 2008. See 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en. Last 
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the Genocide Convention, was valid.423 In the case, the court recalled the East Timor case, 
wherein it held that erga omnes characterization and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are 
two different things and that the court cannot assume jurisdiction merely by erga omnes.424 
The validity of Article IX of the Genocide Convention therefore deals only with the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, which is to begin with subject to the consent of the parties.425 That is 
why jurisdiction of the ICJ is still needed when a state claims jurisdiction based on an erga 
omnes obligation.  
To turn the focus to the current crisis concerning the Rohingya, as at the date Myanmar has 
not made any reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention426. Therefore, the 
jurisdictional path is open for the ICJ. The relevant question is who would bring a case 
against Myanmar and invoke its state responsibility?  
Even though it has been discovered above that Article IX of the Genocide Convention 
requires always the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the erga omnes status, has however some 
relevance. Since Article IX of the Genocide Convention permits any contracting state to 
bring case against another party of the Genocide Convention, this would apply also to states 
that are not directly affected by the genocidal acts. Therefore, they are entitled to seize the 
court and the ICJ would thus have locus standi on the matter.427 This would mean, in 
principle, that any contracting party to the Genocide Convention could bring the case before 
the ICJ after establishing a dispute concerning Myanmar’s state responsibility and claim for 
cessation of the wrongful act, provisional measures and reparation for the victims.428 
Surprisingly, taken into consideration of the nature of the Rohingya crisis, the question of 
state responsibility has not been brought up by the international community. The debates 
and conversations have been focusing on bringing the main military officers before the ICC. 
Not even the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission suggested state responsibility of 
                                                 
423 Case Concerning Armed Activities (3 February 2006), para. 67.  
424 Case Concerning Armed Activities (3 February 2006), para 64, see also East Timor Case (30 June 1995), 
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425 Milanović 2006, pp. 567-568.  
426 Myanmar has, however, made reservations to Articles VI and VIII of the Genocide Convention. These do 
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Myanmar.429  State responsibility was not considered until Michael Becker examined in his 
recent post the Rohingya crisis and the possible parties that could be held responsible for the 
events.430  
In the view of Becker, the of the most potential state to bring such a case before the ICJ 
might be Myanmar’s neighboring country, Bangladesh. Bangladesh has indeed been affected 
by the Rohingya crisis by the massive number of refugees that have fled to the country. 
However, so far Bangladesh has been quite silent on the matter, although it did submit its 
observations to the Prosecutor’s Request431, it has not initiated any proceedings or referred 
the situation to the ICC pursuant to Article 12(a) of the Rome Statute. Further, as regards to 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the reservation made to Article IX of the Genocide Convention 
by Bangladesh seems problematic. The reservation declares that “[f]or the submission of any 
dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the 
consent of all parties to the dispute will be required in each case.”432. This would imply that 
also the consent of Myanmar would be required, which most likely would not be received in 
this case.  
Even if there is a possibility for any contracting state to the Genocide Convention to bring a 
case against Myanmar to the ICJ, it does not mean that states would be willing to do so. As 
Becker points out, proceeding to the ICJ might have both political and economic 
consequences and assumedly that would affect to the number of states who would be up to 
such case. However, should such case be brought to the ICJ, it would compel Myanmar to 
respond to the allegations and facts represented by the Fact-Finding Mission in its Report. 
Moreover, it could lead to ordering of provisional measures that might help the safe 
repatriation of the Rohingya to Myanmar and raise questions of reparations.433  
Considering the pros and cons of proceeding to the ICJ, one issue that should be carefully 
considered is, how would a possible negative finding of genocide affect to the situation? To 
compare, in the Genocide case the ICJ leaned heavily in the findings of the ICTY, this might 
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correspondingly give leverage to Myanmar, should its military officials face charges in the 




“Prevention means acting early…Together with a commitment to accountability, we owe 
this to the millions of victims of the horrific international crimes of the past – and those 
whose lives we may be able to save in the future.434” 
The Rohingya crisis, starting from as early as 1978 (if not earlier), seems to boil down to 
inactivity of the international community to halt and stop the behavior against the norms of 
international law. Passing on a Constitution, that denies the citizenship from the Rohingya, 
and the persecution that followed should have led to more action on the part of the 
international community as it did. Solving problems through diplomatic means is a good and 
well-justified start, but the recurrent disregard of the international norms and obligations and 
non-cooperation by Myanmar government should cause more than shrug of shoulders.  
Although the Genocide Convention has marked an important development in international 
criminal law, it has left room for interpretations. In that task the international tribunals have 
been of great importance. The subsequent case law of the tribunals has mitigated the 
shortcomings of the Genocide Convention and continues to do so. Therefore, for the states 
and their governments, it should not be unclear what the legal elements of the crime of 
genocide are to invoke it.  
International community must have impartial tools to recognize the facts of the crises, so 
that we can separate crime of genocide from other mass atrocities. As regards to the 
Rohingya case, if not other cases as well, the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission has 
appeared to be critical in the reactions of the international community. After the release of 
the Report, the Rohingya crisis has been named genocide more often and the ICC’s 
Prosecutor filed her Request basing to the Report. One suggestion would be that fact-finding 
missions would be engaged earlier, subject to certain triggers.  
Genocide has a well-established status of being a “crime of crime”, which is further 
supported by its nature of ius cogens and erga omnes. Unfortunately, this status does not 
                                                 
434 Stated by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Framework of Analysis 2014, p. 33.  
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come across in the reactions of the international community to the Rohingya crisis. The 
international community may avoid the use of the term “genocide” for the fear of the 
obligations that may follow. Another reason may be that the obligation to prevent is 
somewhat vaguely defined, and the concrete measures to be taken by the states are unclear. 
However, naming genocide as ethnic cleansing, or naming a situation as genocide too late, 
is unbearable for the victims. Ultimately, they are the ones that bear the consequences.  
It is true that when looking at the wording of the Genocide Convention and its Articles, the 
obligation to punish stands out compared to obligation to prevent. However, as it has been 
stated by the ICJ, the obligation to prevent has an independent nature. The power of 
prevention must be understood correctly, it is less costly but also, above all, less politically 
charged alternative to stop genocide. Even though the Genocide Convention, or the ICJ 
judgement for that matter, left open, what are the concrete means to prevent, the international 
community should, however, recognize that it is the task of all states to prevent genocide 
and recall that genocide is a threat to international peace, not a domestic matter. Recognizing 
early warning signs is a good start to prevent genocide but as it can be concluded from the 
Rohingya crisis, the warning signs also need to trigger action. Further, in case potential 
genocidal actors have been recognized, they should also be supervised more closely.  
As regards to large-scale crises, the debate on state sovereignty and its relationships to 
interventions has been dominant. Therefore, it is no wonder that R2P was welcomed as a 
needed tool for prevention populations from mass atrocities, such as genocide. However, in 
terms of use of force, whether by military interventions or other coercive measures, the 
preventive aspect of R2P is prioritized over those. This means that the preventive measures 
should be exhausted before proceeding to more coercive ones.  
As it has been acknowledged, early prevention of mass atrocities is of great importance. 
However, when the crisis has already escalated into mass atrocity, the preventive measures 
offer very little help to the situation. Moreover, not exhausting all the preventive measures 
could serve strong argument for the territorial state to avoid the collective intervention to the 
situation. In addition, also in the case of RP2, there is also the veto powers of UN Security 
Council to tackle. What should be remembered is, in the context of the R2P, that the 
distinction of genocide from the other crimes is not that relevant in the field of peace of 
security. Any of the crimes, whether genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, 
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can constitute a threat to peace and trigger the R2P. Therefore, what might serve good to the 
situation to the Rohingya is that, the R2P applies to ethnic cleansing also. 
Punishment as a mean of prevention has its place as regards to future mass atrocities. As it 
happens in the aftermath, its benefits are not that concrete. Nothing will bring back the lost 
lives. However, this does not mean that the punishment should not be used at all. The 
international law enables the dual track for the punishment of perpetrators, both individual 
and state. The problems relating to punishment is not, however, the lack of possible avenues 
to trials but the lack of ratifications of the conventions and statutes and the imposition of 
reservations that hinder the effective punishment. Therefore, the international community 
should aim for the ratifications of the Rome Statute and withdrawal of reservations from the 
Genocide Convention.  
As regards to the Rohingya crisis, the Prosecutor’s Request to the ICC has been a welcomed 
reaction in otherwise silent climate. The danger of this rather unconventional means to 
pursuit jurisdiction is that it will startle the international community to consider such 
development as weakening their position or state sovereignty. Therefore, the referral by the 
UN Security Council would be the most feasible one. It is noted that Fact-Finding Mission 
also brought up the idea of setting up an ad hoc tribunal for Myanmar – however, in this time 
frame that requires to solve the Rohingya crisis promptly, it would be too time consuming 
and would also need the contribution of the UN Security Council. 
To sum, prevention and observing the early warning signs is the right issue to concentrate 
on, but when they fail, there should be an effective and prompt way to react in operational 
level. Thresholds and limitations to the use force are obviously needed, but time-wise, when 
the genocide is already taking place, the process may be too slow. Surely, the language, goals 
and rationale of the Framework Analysis relating to prevention and R2P are easy to follow 
and understand, and they have verifiably moral appeal. Invoking universal ideas, or 
endeavors, is a vehicle for global attention to the matter. While lacking normative precision, 
the proliferation and the reaffirmation of the concept creates impression of changes in the 
international community and the politics. The world should not, however, be blinded by the 
mere attention, if nothing changes. The danger is, that the whole concept will lose its 




This Thesis is not suggesting that there is no foot hold for diplomacy and reaffirmations of 
what has been the will of the international community. However, history of the mass 
atrocities, such as the one in Rwanda or the current situation Myanmar, shows and proves 
that the early-warning signs have been there for everyone to see. Missing them is not the 
reason why genocide happens, rather disregarding and not knowing what to do with them is. 
If that leads to inactivity and passivity, then the message to the perpetrators is clear – 
preventing genocide is indeed mission impossible. Doing nothing should not be an option. 
